



Arbitration CAS 2015/A/4010 International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) v. All Russia Athletics Federation (ARAF), Vladimir Kanaikin & Russian Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA), award of 25 April 2016 (operative award of 24 March 2016)

Panel: Prof. Luigi Fumagalli (Italy), President; Mr Romano Subiotto QC (United Kingdom); Mr Mika Palmgren (Finland)

Athletics (race walking)

Doping (Athlete's Biological Passport, ABP)

Athlete Biological Passport as evidence

Principle of lex mitior

Concept of fairness

Principle of proportionality

1. An athlete who, based on his Athlete Biological Passport (ABP), is found guilty of an anti-doping rule violation and criticises the reliability of the ABP but does not challenge the respective decision accepts the conclusion that his ABP constituted sufficient evidence to ground the conclusion that he committed an anti-doping rule violation. Conversely, the criticism as to the reliability of the ABP can be understood as aiming to show that insufficient evidence has been submitted to prove that some of the samples included in the ABP of the athlete are abnormal, and therefore to allow the conclusion, from the athlete's perspective, that they should not be taken into account when determining whether the results achieved in the period surrounding those disputed samples have to be disqualified. In the same way, the athlete may invoke any alleged unreliability of the ABP method as a factor to be taken into account when assessing, in general terms, the "fairness" of the disqualification (or of the non-disqualification) of his results.
2. When applying the *lex mitior* principle in case of anti-doping rule violations, either the set of rules applicable at the time when the anti-doping rule violation was committed or otherwise the rules applicable at the time the decision is adopted are to be determined as the applicable set of rules most favourable to the accused, without picking individual provisions from each. The hearing body cannot undertake a rule-by-rule comparison of the two systems, picking the most favourable rule of each system.
3. The concept of "fairness" is a broad one, covering a number of elements that the deciding body can take into account in its decision not to disqualify some results. In the past CAS panels took into account a number of factors, such as the nature and severity of the infringement, the length of time between the anti-doping rule violation, the result to be disqualified and the disciplinary decision, the presence of negative tests between the anti-doping rule violation and the competition at which the result to be disqualified was achieved, and the effect of the infringement on the result at stake. It is

not a single element that is decisive alone: an overall evaluation of them is necessary.

4. The principle of proportionality implies that there must be a reasonable balance between the kind of misconduct and the sanction, and in particular that (i) the measure taken by the governing body can achieve the envisaged goal, (ii) the measure taken by the governing body is necessary to reach the envisaged goal, and (iii) the constraints on the affected person resulting from the measure are justified by the overall interest of achieving the envisaged goal. In other words, to be proportionate, a measure must not exceed what is reasonably required in the search for a legitimate objective.

I. BACKGROUND

1.1 The Parties

1. The International Association of Athletics Federations (“IAAF” or the “Appellant”) is the international federation for the sport of athletics. IAAF is an association under the laws of Monaco and has its headquarters in Monte Carlo, Monaco.
2. The All Russia Athletics Federation (“ARAF” or the “First Respondent”) is the national governing body for the sport of athletics in the Russian Federation and the Member Federation of IAAF for the Russian Federation.
3. Mr Vladimir Kanaikin (the “Athlete” or the “Second Respondent”) is an international-level athlete of Russian nationality specialising in the 20 kilometres race walk event, who has competed at an elite international level for a number of years with considerable success.
4. The Russian Anti-Doping Agency (“RUSADA” or the “Third Respondent”) is the national anti-doping agency established for the Russian Federation.
5. ARAF, the Athlete and RUSADA are hereinafter jointly referred to as the “Respondents”.

1.2 The Dispute between the Parties

6. The object of the dispute between the parties is a portion of a decision issued by a disciplinary committee of RUSADA in an anti-doping case brought against the Athlete, based on the irregularities observed between February 2011 and August 2012 in the athlete’s biological passport (the “ABP”) concerning the Athlete. IAAF started the present arbitration claiming that the applicable anti-doping rules adopted by IAAF (the “IAAF ADR”) to implement the provisions of the World Anti-Doping Code (the “WADC”) had not been correctly applied on a specific point (disqualification of results).
7. The circumstances stated below summarize the main relevant facts concerning the dispute, as

submitted by the parties in their written pleadings or in the evidence offered during the course of the proceedings. Additional facts may be set out, where relevant, in connection with the following legal discussion.

8. A preliminary point of explanation is however necessary to clarify the factual background of the dispute. As mentioned, it follows the application of the ABP model to the Athlete, and some discussions took place in this arbitration about the ABP and its evidentiary value to establish an anti-doping rule violation, and more specifically the use of a prohibited substance or of a prohibited method. As submitted by IAAF, unlike direct detection methods, the ABP focuses on the effect of prohibited substances or methods on the body, rather than on their detection. For such purposes, the ABP was developed as an individual, electronic record for each athlete, in which the results of all doping tests over a period of time are collated. The ABP involves regular monitoring of biological markers on a longitudinal basis to facilitate the indirect detection of prohibited substances and methods. The list of relevant markers for a specific class of substance (*e.g.*, substances enhancing oxygen transfer such as recombinant EPO) are identified and monitored on a regular basis for a given athlete, in order to establish an effective longitudinal monitoring program. The collection and monitoring of values corresponding to these identified markers constitutes an individual longitudinal profile. Each collected sample is analysed following the appropriate analytical protocol and the biological results are incorporated into the Anti-Doping Administration and Management System (ADAMS), which is a web-based database management tool for data entry, storage, sharing, and reporting designed to assist stakeholders and the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”) in their anti-doping operations. The statistical model developed for the ABP program is then applied to the results of analyses to determine an abnormal profile score. More specifically, once the new biological data are entered in ADAMS, a notification is sent to the Athlete Passport Management Unit, which updates the Athlete’s Passport and applies the ABP software, *i.e.* the Adaptive Model. The Adaptive Model is a mathematical model that was designed to identify unusual longitudinal results from athletes. The model calculates the probability of a longitudinal profile of marker values assuming that the athlete has a normal physiological condition. The Athlete Passport Management Unit proceeds with the mandatory steps outlined in the rules, which includes liaising with an expert panel established by the IAAF, if the athlete’s haemoglobin (HGB) and/or OFF-hr-Score (OFFS) values exceed the 99.9 percentile of the expected ranges returned by the Adaptive Model. The statistical result for the athlete does not in itself justify a conclusion that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred, but calls for an explanation by the athlete.
9. In 2009, IAAF started its ABP program. The Athlete was included by the IAAF in its ABP program and subjected to ten in- and out-of-competition blood sample collections between February 2011 and August 2012. The analyses gave the following results¹:

¹ Such results are taken from the IAAF appeal brief in this arbitration, and are in themselves undisputed.

	COLLECTION DATE	RET [%]	HGB	OFF-SCORE
1	25.02.2011	0.25	15.8	128.00
2	10.04.2011	0.39	12.5	87.50
3	20.05.2011	0.25	14.5	115.00
4	16.07.2011	2.08	13.6	49.50
5	27.08.2011	0.20	16.4	137.20
6	08.10.2011	1.35	14.8	78.30
7	17.01.2012	1.04	15.5	93.80
8	13.04.2012	0.56	15.3	108.10
9	11.05.2012	0.64	15.4	106.00
10	03.08.2012	0.34	14.7	112.00

10. The biomarker values from the samples collected from the Athlete were considered to be highly abnormal. As a consequence, the resulting Athlete's profile was sent to three independent experts, who unanimously concluded, in their initial review (the "Initial Review")², that this profile was "highly unlikely" to be "the result of a normal physiological or pathological condition, and may be the result of the use of a prohibited substance or prohibited method". In particular:

- i. Professor Yorck Olaf Schumacher³ in an opinion dated 7 June 2012 observed that:

"The profile of a male athlete is abnormal at 100% for all sequences. The athlete is beyond his upper and lower individual limits several times for all variables.

In the Documentation packages at my disposal at the time of this evaluation, there is no indication that any non-conformity to the analytical standards for the athlete's biological passport might have influenced the results to the disadvantage of the athlete. As most obvious issue, no data loggers were used to monitor the temperature of the samples during transport for certain samples. Conversely, the MCV for one sample (sample 4) is very high, which might have been influenced by an elevated storage temperature. This is supported by the fact that there is a clear discrepancy between Haemoglobin concentration and Haematocrit. With increased temperature, cells will swell and Haematocrit increases, Haemoglobin concentration remains rather stable Given the fact that Haemoglobin level in this sample is rather low, any deviations caused by increased temperature on Haemoglobin (increase?) would therefore be to the advantage of the athlete. This sample shows the highest Reticulocyte % of the entire profile. Inappropriate storage at warm temperature would lead to lower Reticulocyte values for the athlete, and thus be to his advantage in the current context.

Therefore, this shortcoming is, in my opinion, not to the disadvantage of the athlete and even if sample 4 is invalidated, the profile remains highly abnormal.

There are some other minor shortcomings in the documentation, such as several missing forms that can

² It is to be noted that the experts only reviewed the first nine samples included in the ABP. Therefore, sample 10 was not considered in the Initial Review.

³ Professor of internal medicine and sports medicine at the University of Freiburg, Germany.

surely be added to the file.

The most abnormal feature of the profile is sample 5 taken on the eve of the world Championships in Daegu, with high Haemoglobin concentration and virtually suppressed Reticulocytes. Such constellation does not occur in any physiological situation, but is typically observed after the use of an erythropoietic stimulant or after the application of a blood transfusion, both methods increasing red cell mass and leading to the autoregulative pattern of suspended erythropoiesis, such as visible in the athlete.

The athlete claims having been at altitude from July 20th to August 25th, 2011. From the whereabouts, it appears that during this period, he sojourned mainly in Arkhyz (1474m) and Kislovodsk (839m), thus at altitudes that are below what is necessary to trigger haematological changes of the magnitude observed in the athlete. According to his whereabouts, he spent only 10 days in July at altitudes of >2000m (from July 4th to July 14th). Furthermore, the pattern of the blood values in sample 5 (August 27th, 2011) is not what can be expected immediately upon return from altitude. Another Altitude training camp in Tescol (2143m) was apparently conducted from April 26th to May 14th. It is of note that the sample obtained after this training camp (sample 3) is much lower in Haemoglobin concentration than sample 5.

In summary, the abnormal features in this profile are unlikely to be of physiological nature”;

- ii. Professor Giuseppe d’Onofrio⁴ expressed on 16 June 2012 the following opinion:

“This blood profile includes the results of nine blood samples collected from a male Athlete. A formal evaluation of the ABP individual passport demonstrates a 100% probability of abnormality in all parameters. The most striking feature is the alternance, in 2011, between some samples with high hemoglobin, low reticulocytes and high OFF scores and other samples with lower hemoglobin and low OFF scores.

In particular, the samples with an OFF pattern are:

- n. 1, on 25-2-2011, before a competition in Sochi;*
- n. 3, on 20-5-2011, before a competition in Olhãõ;*
- n. 6, on 27-8-2011, before the World Championship in Daegu, when*

the highest hemoglobin and OFF score of the whole profile were recorded. The OFF phase is not a physiological condition and is not seen even in human pathology; it is typically observed after blood manipulations, such as one or two weeks after suspension of a treatment with erythropoietin or similar ESAs, or some days after a blood transfusion. In this case the alternance with at least one test with low hemoglobin and high reticulocytes (indicating blood withdrawal, in the absence of a pathological hemorrhage), suggests a high probability of autologous blood collection and reinfusion, with possible association of ESA treatment far from competitions.

Sample n. 4, which violates the individual ABP limits because of high reticulocytes and low OFF score, has a high MCV and low MCHC, with a pre- analytical time of 26.9 hours. This could be due to storage-induced red cell swelling. Moderate storage damage, however, has no effect on hemoglobin (which is measured after red cell lysis) and cannot increase reticulocytes”;

⁴ Professor of clinical pathology and immunohematology at the Catholic University of the Sacred Heart in Rome, Italy.

iii. Professor Michel Audran⁵ noted in the opinion of 13 June 2012 that:

“Sample 1: the high HGB value (second highest in the profile) the very low and abnormal RET% value (probability 99.9%) and in consequence the high and abnormal (probability 99.9%) Off-core value, are the sign of blood manipulation. Moreover there was a competition 2 days after this sampling.

The HGB increase of 28 g/l between 16/07 and 27/08 /11 can't be physiologic. The high and abnormal (probability 99.9%) RET% value and in consequence very low and abnormal (probability 99.9%) Off-score value of sample 4 and the high and abnormal HGB value, the low and abnormal RET% value and the high and abnormal Off-score values of sample 5 confirm this blood manipulation.

The low HGB value of sample 2 with the very low RET% value is difficult to explain.

For sample 4 too, the HGB value is lower than expected from the RET% value but a hemodilution is possible in this case”.

11. On 19 September 2012, the IAAF forwarded the Initial Review to ARAF and, *inter alia*, in accordance with the IAAF ADR, requested that the Athlete be given an opportunity to explain his abnormal blood profile.
12. On 17 December 2012⁶, the Athlete, instead of providing the requested explanation, signed a voluntary Provisional Suspension Form.
13. IAAF, then, in the subsequent period, sent several letters to ARAF reminding it that it had to review the case of a possible anti-doping rule violation by the Athlete. On 27 June 2014, finally, IAAF sent a notification to ARAF pointing out that, in violation of the applicable IAAF ADR, ARAF had not reviewed the case of the Athlete and informed it that, in the absence of such review by a set deadline, IAAF would take the case to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (the “CAS”) in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the IAAF ADR.
14. On 8 August 2014, ARAF referred the matter to RUSADA, requesting it to review the case, conduct hearings with the Athlete’s participation and decide whether an anti-doping rule violation had been committed.
15. Following ARAF’s referral, RUSADA submitted the ABP of the Athlete to three other independent experts, who provided the following opinions:

i. Professor Robin Parisotto⁷ observed on 23 November 2014 the following:

“Overall there are four distinct features in this profile that require explanation and are outlined below.

⁵ Professor at the biophysical and bioanalysis laboratory of Faculty of Pharmacy, University of Montpellier I, France.

⁶ It is to be noted that the English translation of the decision rendered by the Anti-Doping Committee of RUSADA in the case of the Athlete mentions “17 September 2012” as the date on which the Athlete accepted a provisional suspension. As a result, such date was mentioned by the Appellant in its written submissions. At the hearing, however, it was clarified (and the parties agreed on the point) that the correct date of the provisional suspension is 17 December 2012.

⁷ Australian Institute of Sport, Canberra, Australia.

Observation 1

The overall variability in Haemoglobin (Hb) measures is 31.2 % (125 – 164 g/L). Also the variability in Haematocrit (Hct) measures is 34.5% (37.1 to 49.9). It has been documented ... that variations in Hb exceeding 15% between blood samples from elite endurance athletes would be indicative of blood manipulation. The large variability in Hb measurements particularly noting that the highest Hb value in PRE sample 5 (164), precedes the 2011 World Cup requires explanation.

Observation 2

The decrease in Hb values between samples 1 and 2 (158 to 125) and decreased Hct (49.9 to 37.1) represent the greatest variability between these measures in the profile. These enormous disparities are beyond any normal physiological explanation in such a short period of time (some 6 weeks) and without evidence of significant trauma or blood loss this pattern can only be explained by autobleed.

Observation 3

The pattern observed between samples 4 and 5 shows a marked increase in Hb from 136 to 164 (20.6%) and marked decrease in reticulocytes from 2.08% to 0.20% resulting in an OFF-score (137.2) way beyond the upper reference range limit for males of 110.6. Indeed this OFF-score is beyond the 1:10000 false positive rate at sea level and approaches the 1:10000 false positive rate at altitude The same pattern, however of a lesser magnitude is evident between samples 2 and 3. As samples 3 and 5 are PRE samples it is evident that there has been manipulation in preparation for the respective competitions.

In normal healthy individuals increasing Hb levels are associated with normal and/or increasing reticulocyte levels. There are few if any medical and/or physiological phenomena (such as a medical blood transfusion) which are associated with such combinations of blood parameters. For instance, it is known that permanent high altitude dwellers with high Hb levels descending to sea level appear to have preferential destruction of reticulocytes, a term known as neocytolysis possibly resulting in high Hb and low reticulocyte levels However, the athlete did not indicate altitude exposure between these sample periods and therefore a possible explanation due to altitude exposure can be discounted.

It is intuitive that as Hb increases so should the reticulocytes indicating normal erythropoietic activity. The pattern of high Hb and markedly depressed reticulocytes observed in these two samples are typical of that seen post r-HuEPO administration ... and/or post transfusion

Observation 4

A probable doping scenario is also reflected in the ABP files in which Hb, reticulocytes, OFF-scores and ABPS have all resulted in probabilities of 100%.

NOTE: In sample 4, the MCHC value of 30.4 indicates significant error with the MCV value (104.7) which appears out of context in the profile. This has appeared to have affected the dependent MCV derived values of Hct, MCH and MCHC (but not Hb). The retic value however would remain unaffected by any errors with red blood cell analysis because it is not a value of concentration but rather a value of proportion (ie. percentage). Therefore the retic and Hb results have been included in considering the conclusions in this report.

Comment on reticulocyte analysis

It was noted that in sample 9 the duplicate retic analysis breached WADA Guidelines in that there was a greater than 15% difference between duplicate retic values. This however can easily be mitigated by accepting that the higher of the two values be regarded as the 'official' result for that sample. This would

be in favour of the athlete. Irrespective of which value is considered however it does not change the opinion of the reviewer”,

and reached the following conclusion and recommendation:

“The author believes that the overall variation in extreme Hb measures of 31.2 % (125 – 164 g/L) and Hct measures of 34.5% (37.1 to 49.9) are beyond normal physiological limits. The repeat patterns observed between OOC sample 2 and PRE sample 3 and OOC sample 4 and PRE sample 5 with increased Hb and depressed reticulocyte levels along with similarly depressed reticulocyte values in samples 1 and 10 the findings are strongly suggestive of previous exogenous erythropoietic stimulation and/or blood transfusion. In addition the extremely low Hb value observed in Sample 2 (125) is both physiologically and medically abnormal. As the athlete had not indicated on the Doping Control Form that there were no blood donations or traumatic blood loss this also needs explanation as this could indicate autbleed.

In the absence of any possible underlying medical conditions and/or other reasonable explanations the author of this report recommends that this case be considered for an Anti-Doping Rule Violation under the WADA code 2.2 – Use of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method”.

- ii. Dr Mario Zorzoli⁸ indicated on 27 November 2014 that “the data of the athlete bear several abnormal features” for the following reasons:

“Abnormal HGB sequence

The abnormal evolution of HGB especially in the year 2011 is not physiological. Changes of HGB of the magnitude of those observed between sample 1 and 2 (decrease of more than 20%), or between samples 4 and 5 (increase of more than 20%) are extremely abnormal for a parameter as stable as HGB, which is also confirmed by the different values observed in 2012

It is important to underline that the two highest HGB values (15.8 and 16.8 g/dL) were found in relation to two competitions (the 2011 Russian Championships and the 2011 World Championships respectively) and not during the off-season where HGB would be expected to increase. In fact, in endurance disciplines it is known that during the period of the season when the athlete is competing, HGB values should be lower because of the increased plasma volume secondary to the augmented training and exercise workload. This is not the case for this athlete when we compare the values obtained at the time of the competitions (C) to those collected out-of-competition (O) we observe a clear and significant difference.

It is also worth mentioning the fact that the two samples showing the highest HGB were associated to the two lowest %RET. Such a non-physiological combination gives the two highest OFF values (137.2 and 128) of the whole profile. The significance of an elevated OFF value is considered to be the consequence of a previous blood manipulation which increased the number of circulating red cells, and therefore HGB, either by ESA or by transfusions. To counteract this change in the body homeostasis, the organism reacts by shutting down its own production of red cells (negative feed- back) which is evidenced by the suppressed number of %RET. Consequently, such a combination of elevated HGB and suppressed %RET is not normally found in nature, and cannot be the consequence of a medical condition.

⁸ Geneva, Switzerland. Dr Zorzoli is *inter alia* health manager at the International Cycling Union (UCI).

Abnormal %RET and OFF sequence

As previously mentioned, it is not normal to observe such significant variations of %RET and OFF values, as it is the case for this athlete when we compare the data observed in samples collected at the time of the competition (C) or out-of-competition (O) (Fig.3 and 4), or those obtained in 2011 compared to those of 2012 (Fig. 5 and 6).

This is also corroborated by the changes observed between samples 3 to 5: within 3 months, the %RET goes from 0.25% to 2.08% and then back to 0.2%. This evolution is not normal, with an increase of more than 700% between the first and second value. Additionally, beside some medical conditions, there are no “natural” reasons to have such a low reticulocytes count. Similarly, an extremely high %RET (2.08%) cannot neither be the consequence of a red cell pathology (otherwise %RET would constantly remain elevated), nor has the athlete mentioned a loss of red cells on his doping control form. Likewise, exposure to altitude doesn’t seem to be the reason for such an increase of %RET because on the doping control form no exposure to altitude was mentioned.

Samples 1, 2, 4 and 5

As mentioned above, samples 1, 2, 4 and 5 exceeded the expected limits (population and individual) for many of the measured parameters (HGB, OFF and %RET):

- Sample 1 and 4 exceed the limits for %RET and OFF;*
- Sample 2 exceeded the limit for HGB;*
- Sample 5 was beyond the limits for HGB, %RET and OFF; - Sample 6 exceeded the limit for OFF.*

More specifically, samples 1 and 5 showed an abnormally low %RET at 0.25% and 0.20% respectively, associated with the two highest HGB and consequently the two highest OFF values. As previously discussed, such a constellation of results seems therefore to be the consequence of previous blood manipulations such as the use of erythropoiesis stimulating agents and/or blood transfusions, especially when considered that they were obtained in relation to competitions.

Likewise, the extreme high value of %RET at 2.08% in sample 4 is compatible with the use of ESA.

Conclusions

As mentioned above, the main elements of abnormalities of this profile are related to the extremely variable sequences of HGB, %RET and OFF. This is associated with several individual samples which displayed values beyond the population or individual limits for this athlete.

In fact, high HGB, low %RET and high OFF were mainly found at the time of competitions when compared to out-of-competition samples. This is compatible with what we would expect to observe when blood manipulation takes place at distance from competition, and is confirmed by the high %RET measured on the out-of-competition sample collected on 16.7.2011 (sample 4) and the highest HGB on competition-related samples (samples 1 and 5).

It is therefore my opinion that the likelihood of these abnormalities being due to blood doping, such as the use of ESA and/or blood transfusion is very high. In contrast, the likelihood of such deviations being caused by a medical condition, altitude exposure or any other condition is low. As such, I therefore recommend requesting the athlete’s explanations for his blood values.

I conclude that at this stage, considering the available information obtained within the passport data, and absent a satisfactory explanation from the athlete, that the athlete's profile correspond to what it would be expected to see when a prohibited substance or method was used";

- iii. Professor Pavel Vorobiov⁹ stated on 8 December 2014 the following (the "Vorobiov Opinion"):

"Estimation of blood profile

The profile demonstrates the different fluctuations of ABP parameters in different samples.

In sample 2 level of HGB is extremely low (125g/L). In sample 4 the HGB stay at nearly the lower limit of normal range for male 136g/L. At the same time in sample 5 the HGB is abnormally high (164g/L) as well as in sample 1 (158g/L). Sharp decline level of HGB from 158g/L to 125g/L not was accompanied with marked reticulocytosis (0,25% and 0,39%). And at the same time in sample 4 we see HGB 136 g/L associated with RET% value 2,08%, and in sample 5 level of HGB is 164g/L with RET% value 0,2%. These changes took place within a month. It could be explained by autobleed and further stay at altitude but the athlete didn't note bleeding and trauma.

The levels of RET% in samples 1, 2, 3, 5, 10 are 0,25%, 0,39%, 0,25%, 0,2 and 0,34% respectively, such low physiological ranges for male (0,5%-2,5%) require an explanation. These values can't be explained by changes of altitude.

In samples 1, 3, 5 and 10 there are high value of OFF-score: 128, 115, 137,2 and 112 respectively (physiological ranges for male are $83 \pm 13,8$ from 55,4 to 110,6).

Noteworthy sample 4 where low level of HGB associated with high level of RET% (2,08). Such pattern may be present after autobleed or stimulation of EPO. Within 5 weeks the pattern changes: high level of HGB 164g/L (increase 28g/L) associated with low level of RET (0,2%).

Some changes in this profile could be explained by stay at altitude. In normal healthy individuals increasing of HGB levels are associated with normal and/or increasing reticulocyte levels. For instance, it is known that permanent high altitude dwellers with high Hb levels descending to sea level appear to have preferential destruction of reticulocytes, and as result high HGB and low reticulocyte levels. However level of RET of this athlete at altitude and without it is the equally low. The level of RET is equally low at the sea level and at altitude, it is equally low also in case of HGB more than 160g/L and in case of the lowest HGB in profile (125 g/L). Such discordant changes may indicate blood manipulation (introduction of erythrocytes) and/or use of ESA.

In general this profile demonstrates high variability level of HGB of 31,2% (from 125g/L to 164g/L). It is considered that variations in HGB exceeding 15% between blood samples from elite endurance athletes would be indicative of blood manipulation. Furthermore great difference of HGB is noted in pre-competition period prior to major events, that most notably in sample 5 (HGB - 164g/L), which comes before the Word Cup 2011.

The fall of HGB between samples 1 and 2 (from 158g/L to 125g/L) stays outside of physiological explanation and this fact may be explain only by autobleed.

The level of HGB increases considerably between samples 4 and 5 from 136g/L to 164g/L (20,6%) and the level of RET% significantly decreases from 2,08% to 0,20%. OFF-score became 137 and went

⁹ Professor, Department of Hematology and Geriatrics, First Medical University in Moscow.

above high normal range for male (55,4 - 110,6). The same pattern of blood values is noted in samples 2 and 3 but it is less obvious. It is evident that changes in pre-competition samples 3 and 5 are result of blood manipulation in anticipation of preparation to competitions.

Conclusion

The main abnormalities of the athlete's blood profile ... can be found in all samples. Separately these changes are within the normal range in some samples, but in the comparison they are not physiological.

The author of this report believes that these changes of blood parameters were caused by blood manipulation and/or use of ESA. According to the WADA ABP Operating Guidelines, Version 4.0, considering the information within the RUSADA, it is high probability that the longitudinal profile is the result of prohibited methods of stimulation of erythropoiesis".

16. On 12 December 2014, RUSADA informed the Athlete that, based on the further expert review, it was proceeding with a disciplinary case against him based on the atypical profile in his ABP, and gave the Athlete an opportunity to provide an explanation in that respect.
17. On 12 January 2015, the Athlete replied that, as he was unable to scientifically rebut the experts' conclusions, he admitted the charges brought against him and asked for the hearing to be conducted in his absence.
18. On 20 January 2015, the Disciplinary Anti-Doping Committee of RUSADA (the "Anti-Doping Committee") held a hearing in the Athlete's absence. The IAAF was not a party to the RUSADA proceedings and was not asked to participate in the proceedings.
19. On 20 January 2015, the Anti-Doping Committee issued the decision No. 6/2015 (the "Decision"), which, in its unchallenged English translation, reads as follows:
 - "1) *The Athlete VLADIMIR KANAIKIN is found guilty of anti-doping rule violation (Art 32.2. (b) of the IAAF Anti-Doping Rules which were in force on the date of anti-doping rule violation):*
 - 2) *The Athlete VLADIMIR KANAIKIN is declared ineligible for life according to the Art 40.7 of the IAAF Anti-Doping Rules which were in force on the date of anti-doping rule violation.*
 - 3) *Pursuant to the Art 40.9 of the IAAF Anti-Doping Rules which are in force from 1 January 2015 and taking into account fairness and proportionality the competitive results of the Athlete VLADIMIR KANAIKIN are declared disqualified within the following periods:*
 - *25 January 2011 – 25 March 2011*
 - *16 June 2011 – 27 September 2011".*
20. In the Decision, the Anti-Doping Committee found that the anti-doping rule violation described in Article 32.2(b) of the applicable version of the IAAF ADR [*"Use or Attempted Use by an Athlete of a Prohibited Substance or a Prohibited Method"*] had been committed, and sanctioned the Athlete with a period of ineligibility in the measure it found proper and proportionate for a second violation (since the Athlete had already received a first "reduced" sanction in 2005), starting from the date of the provisional suspension. With respect to the "selective"

disqualification of results imposed in the Decision, the Anti-Doping Committee reasoned as follows:

- “44. Pursuant to Art. 40.8 IAAF Anti-Doping Rules which were in force in 2009-2012 (hereinafter referred as “Old IAAF ADR”), i.e. within the period when the IAAF was collecting the blood samples for ABP purposes, all competitive results of the Athlete from the date of anti-doping rule violation through the date of provisional suspension shall be disqualified.
45. In the meantime, on 1 January 2015 new IAAF Anti-Doping Rules entered in force (“New IAAF ADR”) where the results disqualification rules have been amended. In New IAAF ADR this provision contains additional clause which requires to disqualify all competitive results of the Athlete “unless fairness requires otherwise”.
46. The Commission notes that although the New IAAF ADR were not effective in 2009-2012, the Commission is entitled to apply it in the present matter on the basis of “lex mitior” which is foreseen by the Art 49 of the New IAAF ADR.
47. “Lex mitior” allows the hearing body to apply the rules which entered in force after an anti-doping rule violation had been committed provided that such rules establish more preferable position for a person which is subject to disciplinary proceedings. Thus, the Commission suggests that the New IAAF ADR contain more preferable position for a person under disciplinary proceedings allowing to disqualify competitive results unless fairness requires otherwise.
48. Then, the Commission shall set up an approach for disqualification of results with “fairness” principle. In this regard the Commission has to refer again to the CAS jurisprudence in similar cases in sports other than athletics which rules allowed heretofore to “selectively” disqualify competitive results of the athletes obtained after the date of anti-doping rule violation.
49. In CAS 2010/A/2235 [...] the CAS Panel ruled that the disqualification shall be applied only to those results which were likely to be affected by the anti-doping rule violation.
50. In furtherance of this approach the CAS Panel determined the samples which showed abnormal blood values and disqualified the results which had been obtained in the period between these 2 (two) samples plus 1 (one) month after the last “abnormal” sample.
51. The Commission suggests that this rationale slightly amended keeping in mind peculiarities of this case may serve as a basis for disqualification of results in the present matter as well. The Commission has thoroughly examined the opinions of 6 IAAF and RUSADA experts and determined the samples with abnormal blood values. Given that anti-doping organization shall have the burden of proof when establishing an anti-doping rule violation and the standard of proof shall be greater than mere balance of probabilities but less than beyond reasonable doubt, the Commission decides to consider as “abnormal” the samples which contained abnormal values according to the opinions of not less than 5 experts.
52. Under such approach the Commission declares abnormal the samples #1 (25 February 2011), #4 (16

July 2011), #5 (27 August 2011). Therefore, the Commission according to “fairness” principle shall obligatory disqualify the competitive results of the athlete within the period which commences 1 month prior to the date of abnormal sample and ends 1 month after the date of abnormal sample, and other results which may be affected by the anti-doping rule violation”.

21. The Decision was notified to IAAF, with an English translation, on 9 February 2015.

2. THE ARBITRAL PROCEEDINGS

2.1 The CAS Proceedings

22. On 25 March 2015, IAAF filed a statement of appeal with the CAS, pursuant to Article R48 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (the “Code”), to challenge the Decision, naming ARAF and the Athlete as respondents.

23. The statement of appeal had attached 2 exhibits and contained the designation of Mr Romano Subiotto, QC as an arbitrator.

24. On 1 April 2015, the CAS Court Office forwarded to ARAF and the Athlete the Appellant’s statement of appeal. In the letter to the parties, the CAS Court Office noted that distinct appeals had been brought by IAAF to challenge decisions rendered by RUSADA in disciplinary proceedings regarding different athletes with regard to their atypical ABP profiles (the “Other Appeals”), which had been registered as follows:

- CAS 2015/A/4005, *International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) v. All Russia Athletics Federation & Sergey Kirdyapkin*
- CAS 2015/A/4006, *International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) v. All Russia Athletics Federation & Yuliya Zaripova*
- CAS 2015/A/4007, *International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) v. All Russia Athletics Federation & Sergey Bakulin*
- CAS 2015/A/4008, *International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) v. All Russia Athletics Federation & Olga Kaniskina*
- CAS 2015/A/4009, *International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) v. All Russia Athletics Federation & Valeriy Borkin*

and invited the parties to inform the CAS Court Office whether they agreed to submit the case regarding the Athlete to the same Panel to be appointed also for the Other Appeals.

25. On the same day, 1 April 2015, the CAS Court Office informed RUSADA that an appeal had been lodged against the Decision in the case concerning the Athlete and indicated that the appeal had not been directed at RUSADA. The CAS Court Office, at the same time, informed RUSADA that, if it intended to participate in the arbitration, it had to file with CAS an application to this effect.

26. On 10 April 2015, RUSADA confirmed, in a letter to the CAS Court Office, that it was ready *“to participate as a party in this case to defend its decision”*.
27. In a letter of 13 April 2015, the Second Respondent appointed Mr Mika Palmgren as an arbitrator and confirmed his agreement that the proceedings in this case and in the Other Appeals be referred to the same Panel.
28. On 15 April 2015, the First Respondent informed the CAS Court Office that it agreed to the participation of RUSADA in this arbitration and that the case of the Athlete be submitted to the same Panel appointed for the Other Appeals.
29. On 16 April 2015, the Second Respondent confirmed its agreement to the intervention of RUSADA.
30. On 17 April 2015, the Appellant indicated to the CAS Court Office that it had no objections to the intervention of RUSADA in this arbitration.
31. On 20 April 2015, as a result, the CAS Court Office advised the parties that RUSADA was considered as a party to the arbitration, and that the same Panel would be appointed to hear the case of the Athlete as well as the Other Appeals.
32. On 20 April 2015, the First Respondent agreed to the appointment as an arbitrator of Mr Palmgren.
33. On 27 April 2015, RUSADA also agreed to the appointment of Mr Palmgren.
34. On 4 May 2015, within an extended deadline, the Appellant submitted its appeal brief, in accordance with Article R51 of the Code, together with 26 exhibits, which included, *inter alia*, an additional expert opinion dated 18 March 2015 (the “Joint Expert Report”) jointly signed by Professor Schumacher, Professor d’Onofrio and Professor Audran, the authors of the Initial Review.
35. On 8 May 2015, the Appellant’s appeal brief was forwarded to the Respondents. Correspondence then followed with respect to the deadline for the submissions of the Respondents’ answers.
36. On 14 July 2015, the CAS Court Office informed the parties, on behalf of the President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division, that the Panel had been constituted as follows: Prof. Luigi Fumagalli, President of the Panel; Mr Romano Subiotto, QC and Mr Mika Palmgren, arbitrators.
37. The Respondents, within extended deadlines, submitted their answers, in accordance with Article R55 of the Code, as follows:
 - i. on 11 July 2015, the First Respondent filed its answer, with no exhibits attached;
 - ii. on 24 July 2015, the Second Respondent filed his answer, together with 9 exhibits and a

list of experts to be heard (Dr. Max Testa, Dr. Roberto Corsetti, Dr. Nicolas Faber, Dr. Bernard Vandengiste, Professor Pavel Vorobiov and Professor Sergey Rumyantsev);

- iii. on 10 July 2015, the Third Respondent filed its answer, together with 6 exhibits.
- 38. In a letter of 11 September 2015, the Appellant, noting some submissions contained in the Second Respondent's answer, in which "*the athlete ... would appear to be arguing that the ABP concept is not sufficiently reliable or scientifically sound, thereby casting doubt as to whether the violation against the athlete should be upheld*", requested that the Athlete be required "*to clarify immediately*" some issues in that respect.
- 39. On 17 September 2015, the CAS Court Office advised the parties that the Panel, having considered the IAAF's request of 11 September 2015, had decided not to allow a second round of written submissions and to hold a hearing where the parties would have the opportunity to present their respective cases, as outlined in the written submissions.
- 40. On 22 September 2015, the Appellant insisted on its request that the Second Respondent be required to clarify his position on the issues mentioned in the letter of 11 September 2015.
- 41. In a letter of 25 September 2015, the parties were informed that the Panel had decided to hold a hearing in Lausanne, Switzerland, on 2 and 3 December 2015.
- 42. On 1 October 2015, the Appellant reiterated its requests of 11 and 25 September 2015.
- 43. On 8 October 2015, the CAS Court Office advised the parties that the Panel had decided to confirm its decision of 17 September 2015.
- 44. On 13 November 2015, the CAS Court Office transmitted to the parties a draft hearing schedule, indicating that the case of the Athlete would be discussed simultaneously with the discussion on the Other Appeals, with the sole exception of case CAS 2015/A/4006, that, as per a request of the athlete involved in that case, would be discussed separately.
- 45. Correspondence was then exchanged between the parties as to the organization and the schedule of the hearing.
- 46. On 24 November 2015, and for such purposes, a conference call was held with the participation of the President of the Panel and the parties' counsel. During this conversation, the parties agreed that the case CAS 2015/A/4006 would be heard on a different date, and therefore that on 2 and 3 December 2015 the case of the Athlete would be discussed together with the Other Appeals, with the exception of case CAS 2015/A/4006. In that respect, and as a result, the President of the Panel made it clear that, in order to safeguard the integrity of all proceedings, the award in the arbitration regarding the Athlete would be issued only after all Other Appeals (including CAS 2015/A/4006) were heard, even though it was clear that every case would be decided only on the basis of its specificities, and of the parties' respective pleadings and evidence. In the conference call, discussions also took place with respect to the Second Respondent's request that his experts, including those who had not provided an expert report,

be heard last.

47. As a result, the Panel, in a letter dated 24 November 2015, advised the parties that “*experts and ‘counter-experts’ [would] be allowed to attend the hearing ... at the same time and to intervene under the control of the Panel*”, and set a deadline for the Second Respondent to file a list of issues, as detailed as possible, on which his expert(s) intended to express their opinion.
48. In a letter of 25 November 2015, the Second Respondent “*strongly*” protested against the procedural steps mentioned in the CAS letter of 24 November 2015, asking the Panel to reconsider them. In particular, the Second Respondent maintained: that it was not acceptable that a decision on his case be rendered only after hearing case CAS 2015/A/4006, since the cases should be decided “*totally separately*”; that the Athlete cannot be forced to reveal his defence strategy before the hearing, and therefore that no list of issues for the experts could be requested; and that the experts designated by the Second Respondent had to be heard after the experts called by the Appellant and that the Appellant’s experts should not be allowed to attend the hearing before and after their testimony. In the alternative, the Athlete requested to be provided with copy of the other parties’ submissions in case CAS 2015/A/4006.
49. On the same 25 November 2015, the CAS Court Office, writing on behalf of the Panel, advised the parties of the following:

“As repeatedly mentioned during the conference call of yesterday, all cases will be decided by the Panel on the basis of their individual peculiarities and of the parties’ submissions in their respect. No argument raised in one case will be used in another case, if not specifically raised also in such other case. Therefore, the request of communication to Dr Valloni of the submissions and documents filed by the other parties in case CAS 2015/A/4006 is denied.

The Panel’s intention to issue the arbitral awards in all cases after all cases are heard does not contradict the foregoing and does not mean that the cases concerning the athletes represented by Dr Valloni will be decided after hearing the case of Ms Zaripova. The intention to issue all the arbitral awards at the same time concerns only their notification to the parties and is intended to protect the integrity of all proceedings.

The Panel does not treat the experts indicated by the parties as being part of the public. Therefore, the Panel has decided to allow their attendance at the hearing when another expert is heard, in order to answer the questions that the Panel or all parties may have by way of “experts’ conferencing”. This rule applies to all the experts: therefore, the experts appointed by the athletes are invited to attend when the experts of the Appellant will be heard and will have the opportunity to intervene and contradict the statements of the Appellant’s experts.

The Panel is fully determined to guarantee the athletes’ right to be heard. Therefore, the Panel allows the athletes (and their counsel) to discuss with the experts they have appointed any issue relevant to their cases. In the list to be provided ... therefore, the athletes can indicate any issue they wish. At the same time, the Panel is striving to find a way to ensure that, on the basis of the list of issues that the athletes are invited to provide, it can benefit as much as possible from the presentations of the athlete’s experts. In the same way, the Panel is aware of the Appellant’s claim not to be taken by surprise. As a result, the athletes’ request that the Panel reconsiders its decision is denied”.

50. In a letter of the same day, 25 November 2015, the First Respondent expressed its support to

the Second Respondent's position.

51. On 27 November 2015, the CAS Court Office, on behalf of the President of the Panel, issued an order of procedure (the "Order of Procedure"), which was accepted and countersigned by the Appellant, ARAF and RUSADA. The Second Respondent declined to sign the Order of Procedure.
52. On 27 November 2015, the Appellant expressed its position and dissent with regard to the Second Respondent's letter of 25 November 2015.
53. In a letter of 27 November 2015, the Third Respondent informed the Panel that WADA had declared RUSADA "non-compliant" with the WADC and that it had to "immediately cease all anti-doping activities". Therefore, it requested the CAS to suspend the hearing scheduled "till clarification of RUSADA's status".
54. On 27 November 2015, the Second Respondent reiterated his rejection of the procedural measures, alleging that they "clearly favour the Appellant and undermine the Respondents' rights to a fair trial in an intolerable way". At the same time, the Second Respondent raised another issue "which heavily undermines [the] right [of the Athlete] to a fair trial" as follows:

"As WADA suspended RUSADA ... with immediate effect, WADA seems to think that RUSADA is not entitled to attend the hearings of 2 and 3 December 2015 and is not entitled to act in the proceedings. This means that RUSADA cannot defend the decisions against which the Appellant appealed and that the proceedings are led with a Respondent 3 missing. This is unacceptable and this does also affect the position of the Respondents since RUSADA is not there to defend the decision taken. The proceedings at hand cannot be continued if [RUSADA] is not entitled to act and defend itself. Apart of that, the decision to suspend RUSADA is not final, hence another reason to suspend the proceedings up to the moment there is clarify about the position of RUSADA. Hence, we clearly support the position of RUSADA to wait until further clarification.

Furthermore, the decision of WADA to suspend RUSADA triggers an important issue about the jurisdiction of the CAS. Indeed, Respondents think that a suspension lift the arbitration clause as RUSADA is no longer considered by WADA as a party and does not have any rights in these proceedings. Therefore, WADA's decision affected the arbitration clause and Respondents do not accept CAS jurisdiction anymore and is not accepting any change in the way the procedure is supposed to be run".

55. On 27 November 2015, the Panel denied the Athlete's request to cancel the hearing scheduled for 2 and 3 December 2015, confirmed a deadline for the Second Respondent's filing of a list of issues that would be discussed by his experts, and invited the other parties to comment on the remaining issues raised by the Athlete and by RUSADA in their letters of 27 November 2015.
56. On 30 November 2015, the CAS Court Office, writing on behalf of the Panel with respect to the recent correspondence and chiefly with regard to the invitation to the Athlete (and to all the athletes whose cases would be heard at the upcoming hearing) to provide a list of the issues, as detailed as possible, that would be discussed by his (their) experts, specified the following:

“In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the Panel wishes to clarify the point, and provide some guidance with respect to the level of detail of such list. More specifically, the Panel confirms that it is inviting the athletes to provide only a description of the object of the experts’ declarations of the same kind and detail as that provided by the Appellant (see for instance §§ 40 and 41 of the appeal brief in CAS 2015/A/4005). At the same time, it is confirmed that the athletes can indicate any issue relevant to the case they wish”.

57. On 30 November 2015, the Appellant forwarded a communication received from WADA confirming that “RUSADA’s non-compliant status does not prevent it from appearing as a respondent party to on-going CAS proceedings”.
58. On 1 December 2015, the Second Respondent, while again noting the “Panel’s denial to grant the right to a fair defence” and criticizing “the latest decisions of the Panel which clearly favour the Appellant”, listed the issues to be discussed with the experts as follows:
 - “1) Accuracy of the Athlete Biological Passport and the method to detect doping
 - 2) IAAF’s and WADA’s approach on doping cases
 - 3) Examination of the samples in the cases at hand
 - 4) Examination of the IAAF’s experts’ opinion in the cases at hand”.
59. On 1 December 2015, the Appellant reacted to the Second Respondent’s letter of even date objecting to the list of issues submitted by the Athlete and more specifically to the point concerning the “Accuracy of the Athlete Biological Passport and the method to detect doping”.
60. A hearing was held in Lausanne on 2 and 3 December 2015, as per the notice in the letter of 25 September 2015. The Panel was assisted by Mr Fabien Cagneux, Counsel to CAS. The following persons attended the hearing:
 - i. for the Appellant: Mr Huw Roberts, Mr Nicolas Zbinden and Mr Ross Wenzel, counsel;
 - ii. for ARAF Mr Artem Patsev, counsel;
 - iii. for the Athlete Mr Lucien W. Valloni and Ms Stéphanie Oneyser, counsel;
 - iv. for RUSADA Ms Anna Antseliovich, Head of the RUSADA Results Management Department.
61. At the hearing, after the opening statements of the parties, Professor Schumacher (via video connection), Professor d’Onofrio (physically present) and Professor Vorobiov (via phone connection), *i.e.* experts who had signed written opinions with respect to the Appellant’s case, were heard in direct, cross- and re-direct examination. The Second Respondent indicated that no additional expert mentioned in his answer would appear. The Panel therefore noted that the pre-hearing discussions concerning the Second Respondent’s request to be allowed to hear the deposition also of those experts he appointed (and chiefly of Professor Rumyantsev), who had not signed an expert opinion, had become moot.

62. The contents of the declarations of the experts can be summarised as follows¹⁰:
- i. Professor Schumacher confirmed the opinion expressed in the Initial Review and in the Joint Expert Report and explained that EPO increases an athlete's maximal oxygen uptake (the "VO_{2max}") by 1% to 4% for a period of up to 4 weeks after the erythropoiesis stimulation, depending on the dosage of its administration, and confirmed that the use of micro-doses over a longer period can produce long-lasting effects. Professor Schumacher declared having appeared before CAS in all major ABP cases, and that he never assisted an athlete in CAS proceedings; however, he underlined that in several occasions, while reviewing ABP profiles, he had expressed an opinion favourable to the athlete;
 - ii. Professor d'Onofrio also confirmed the opinion expressed in the Initial Review and in the Joint Expert Report, and examined the values contained in the Athlete's ABP (§ 9 above), which show fluctuations from "ON phases" to "OFF phases", underlining their abnormality. Professor d'Onofrio also confirmed that he had expressed the opinion in 2010 that the panel in charge of the initial review should preferably be composed of 9 members, but that he now thinks that the decision to limit the panel to 3 experts was correct. In this case, the opinions of the experts were unanimous;
 - iii. Professor Vorobiov also examined the values contained in the Athlete's ABP, confirming the position expressed in the Vorobiov Opinion, and declared that sufficient scientific documentation exists to validate the reliability of the ABP program, even though in his opinion some elements (such as altitude and hydration) should be better considered.
63. During the hearing, the parties specified their arguments in support of their respective petitions. In that context, *inter alia*:
- i. with respect to the issue of CAS jurisdiction:
 - a. the Second Respondent confirmed his objection, announced in the letter of 27 November 2015 (§ 54 above), as based (α) on the unclear position of RUSADA, following WADA's declaration that RUSADA had to suspend all anti-doping activities under the WADC, and (β) on the suspension of ARAF by IAAF. In this connection, the Second Respondent underlined that he had only agreed to submit to CAS disputes with ARAF and RUSADA;
 - b. the Appellant indicated the basis for CAS jurisdiction and replied to the Athlete's objection (defined to be "*parasitic*", "*vexatious*", "*opportunistic*" and to amount to "*inappropriate procedural conduct*") by referring to the declaration of WADA, which had confirmed the possibility for RUSADA to participate in the arbitration;
 - c. the First Respondent declared that the suspension imposed by IAAF did not preclude its participation in the CAS proceedings and that it did not agree with the

¹⁰ This summary does not necessarily follow the order of presentation of the experts and intends only to give an indication of a few points touched at the hearing. The Panel, however, considered the entirety of the declarations rendered at the hearing.

Athlete's objection;

- d. the Third Respondent confirmed receipt of a communication on the part of WADA indicating that it could participate in the arbitration;
- ii. with regard to the merits of the appeal:
- a. the Appellant underlined, in general terms, the effects of blood doping and the impact of EPO administration on sporting performances and on training as a result of the improvement it causes on the athlete's VO_{2max} . With specific reference to the Athlete, then, only continuous doping practices could explain the atypical profile of his ABP, and chiefly the fluctuations in the blood values it shows. At the same time, the Appellant submitted that the appeal is limited to the issue of the retroactive disqualification of results. The Second Respondent's announced challenge to the ABP as a method to detect doping practices was therefore irrelevant, noting that Professor Vorobiov also confirmed the ABP program's reliability. Finally, the Appellant contended that the application of the *lex mitior* principle does not allow "cherry-picking" and cannot result in the creation of non-existing rules. In that regard, reference was made to a judgment rendered on 18 July 2013 by the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) in the case of *Maktouf and Damjanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina*, and to a decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (ATF 119 IV 145) of 25 June 1993. However, the Appellant:
 - underlined that the ineligibility period imposed to the Athlete (life ban), consistent with the provisions in force at the time of the anti-doping rule violation, was no longer in line with the rules in force at the time the Decision was adopted;
 - requested that the ineligibility period be reduced to eight years, starting from the date of provisional suspension, *i.e.* to a measure consistent with the rules in force at the time the Decision was adopted; and
 - conceded that the rules in force at the time of the Decision, more favourable to the Athlete, could provide for a global legal framework to assess the consequences of the anti-doping rule violation committed by the Athlete, including the "fairness exception" to the ordinary disqualification of results thereby provided. In any case,
 - indicated that the Athlete cannot benefit from such "fairness exception", since he was involved in repeated, intentional and severe anti-doping rule violations;
 - b. the First Respondent confirmed that the Decision correctly and fairly applied the relevant rules, including the *lex mitior* principle, and properly took into account the limited temporal effect of EPO administration. In any case, according to ARAF, the opinion of the IAAF experts evolved over the times, and IAAF failed to prove its contentions;
 - c. the Second Respondent described the IAAF's submissions to be "*fantasy talking*",

since no prohibited substance had ever been detected in the samples provided by the Athlete. In any case, in the Second Respondent's opinion, the Appellant failed to rebut the criticism voiced in the scientific literature against the ABP program and its reliability, still disputed, as an indirect method of detection of an anti-doping rule violation. In addition, the analytical values of the Athlete could be influenced by other factors, such as a virus, or the altitude, which had not been taken into account: as a result, the ABP profile does not show with the required probability level that the Athlete had indulged in doping practices. Moreover, the "fairness exception" had to be applied, in light of its general nature, the necessity of its broad interpretation, and the *lex mitior* principle. Finally, the Athlete confirmed his acceptance of the Appellant's request, expressed at the hearing, that the ineligibility period be reduced to 8 years;

- d. the Third Respondent emphasised that the "fairness exception" had been properly applied to the disqualification of results in this case.
 - e. all the parties agreed that the date on which the Athlete accepted the provisional suspension in 17 December 2012¹¹.
64. At the conclusion of the hearing, after making closing submissions summarizing their respective cases, the Appellant, the First Respondent and the Third Respondent expressly stated that they did not have any objection in respect of their right to be heard and to be treated equally in the arbitration proceedings. The Second Respondent, through counsel, while expressly declaring that he no longer had any objection in respect of his right to be heard and to be treated equally in the arbitration proceedings, only made a reservation to confirm his objection to the CAS jurisdiction.
65. After the hearing, on the basis of the Panel's directions, the parties timely lodged with the CAS Court Office the quantification of their respective cost claims.

2.2 The Position of the Parties

66. The following outline of the parties' positions is illustrative only and does not necessarily comprise every contention put forward by the parties. The Panel, indeed, has carefully considered, for the purposes of the legal analysis which follows, all the submissions made by the parties, even if there is no specific reference to those submissions in the following summary.

a. The Position of the Appellant

67. The IAAF submitted the following prayers for relief in the merits:

- "(i) the IAAF's appeal is admissible;*
- (ii) the samples collected from Mr Kanaikin on 20 May 2011 (sample 3) and 3 August 2012 (sample 10)*

¹¹ See footnote 6 above.

are abnormal;

- (iii) *the decision of the RUSADA Commission not to disqualify Mr Kanaikin's results at the 2011 European Race Walking Cup on 21 May 2011, the Russian Winter meeting on 5 February 2012 and the IAAF Race Walking Cup on 12 May 2012 be set aside; and*
- (iv) *all competitive results obtained by Mr Kanaikin from the date of first commission of the anti-doping rule violation (25 February 2011) through to the commencement of his provisional suspension (17 October 2012) [17 December 2012]¹² be disqualified, with all resulting consequences in accordance with IAAF Rule 40.9; or*
- (v) *in the alternative, all competitive results obtained by Mr Kanaikin from the date of first commission of the anti-doping rule violation (25 February 2011) through to the last commission of the anti-doping rule violation (3 August 2012) be disqualified, with all resulting consequences in accordance with IAAF Rule 40.9; or*
- (vi) *in the further alternative, all competitive results obtained by Mr Kanaikin that are likely to have been affected by anti-doping rule violations be disqualified (including the 2011 European Race Walking Cup and the 2012 Olympic Games), with all resulting consequences in accordance with IAAF Rule 40.9; and*
- (vii) *the ARAF and Mr Kanaikin are ordered to pay the IAAF the costs that it has incurred in bringing this appeal".*

68. As already mentioned, IAAF challenges the Decision on only a single point. In fact, the appeal was not about whether the Athlete committed an anti-doping rule violation under the IAAF ADR, or about the appropriate period of ineligibility to be imposed on the Athlete for such anti-doping rule violation: *"the sole issue in this appeal concerns the further consequences of Mr Kanaikin's repeated blood doping in terms of the disqualification of his results in competitions in which he successfully participated during the relevant period 2011-2012 in which he doped"*. In that regard, IAAF noted that the Athlete's result at the 2011 World Championships was disqualified by the Anti-Doping Committee, but that the results obtained at the 2011 European Race Walking Cup, at the 2012 Russian Winter Indoor Meeting, at the 2012 World Race Walking Cup and at the 2012 Olympic Games were left untouched. In the Appellant's opinion, all results from 25 February 2011 onwards (the date on which the Athlete first committed an anti-doping rule violation) should be annulled, without exceptions, pursuant to Article 40.9 of the IAAF ADR. At the hearing, however, the Appellant indicated that the ineligibility period could be reduced to eight years, starting from the date of provisional suspension, *i.e.* to a measure consistent with the rules in force at the time the Decision was adopted.

69. IAAF considers that the "fairness exception" set forth in Article 40.9 of the IAAF ADR, as contained in Chapter 3 of the IAAF Competition Rules in their 2015 edition (the "2015 IAAF ADR"), should not be applied to the Athlete's case. In that regard, the Appellant challenges the Decision, which applied said "fairness exception" as more favourable to the Athlete (under the *lex mitior* doctrine) than the corresponding provision (Article 40.9) in Chapter 3 of 2009 edition

¹² See footnote 6 above.

the IAAF Competition Rules (the “2009 IAAF ADR”)¹³, relevant under the “*tempus regit actum* principle”. IAAF in that regard submits that:

- i. as a matter of principle,
 - in its appeal brief, it accepted that “*the RUSADA Commission’s determination that ... the rule against which the issue of the disqualification of ... results is to be examined, is Rule 40.9 of the 2015 edition of the IAAF Rules*”;
 - at the hearing, then,
 - √ it contended that the application of the *lex mitior* principle does not allow “cherry-picking” and cannot result in the creation of non-existing rules: the “*lex mitior*” principle requires a comparison of different sets of rules, and the application in its entirety of the more favourable set to the accused, but cannot result in the artificial creation of an artificial system of rules composed of provisions belonging to different sets. In support of such contention the Appellant referred to a judgment rendered on 18 July 2013 by the European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber) in the case of *Maktouf and Damjanovic v. Bosnia and Herzegovina* and to a decision of the Swiss Federal Tribunal (ATF 119 IV 145) of 25 June 1993;
 - √ however, it underlined that the ineligibility period to be imposed to the Athlete should be reduced to a measure (eight years) consistent with the provisions in force at the time the Decision was adopted. Therefore, it conceded that the rules in force at the time of the Decision may provide for a global legal framework to assess all the consequences of the anti-doping rule violation committed by the Athlete, including the “fairness exception” to the ordinary disqualification of results thereby provided;
- ii. however, in the actual case, there are no grounds for the “fairness exception” to apply in the case of an athlete (like the Athlete) who engaged in intentional, serious and repeated acts of doping over a long period of time. In the Appellant’s opinion, the Athlete is not an innocent competitor, who inadvertently ingested a stimulant on a single occasion; this is the case of an athlete whose ABP records a total of five instances of blood doping out of ten samples collected from him in the period from February 2011 to August 2012 (the abnormal samples being at least 1, 3, 4, 5 and 10), who engaged in intentional and carefully planned blood doping in connection with his preparation for major international competitions in at least 2011 and 2012, and deprived clean competitors of the opportunity

¹³ It is in that respect to be underlined, as the parties acknowledged in their submissions, that the subsequent editions of the IAAF Competition Rules, of 2010-2011 and of 2012-2013, in force before the 2015 IAAF ADR became applicable, contained anti-doping rules identical to those set by the 2009 IAAF ADR. Therefore, for ease of reference, any mention to the 2009 IAAF ADR shall be intended to cover also those editions which followed them, pre-dating the 2015 IAAF ADR.

to earn medals at such competitions. In support of this conclusion, the Appellant refers chiefly to the expert opinions in the Initial Review and in the Joint Expert Report, in which Professors Schumacher, d'Onofrio and Audran answered the questions asked by IAAF as follows:

1. Do you agree with the conclusions of the RUSADA Disciplinary Commission that samples 1, 4 and 5 of the athlete's profile are abnormal as evidence of blood doping?

We refer to our initial reviews In these documents, we had independently identified several samples as abnormal, notably samples 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. We therefore agree with the conclusion of the RUSADA Disciplinary Commission, but would also qualify other samples as abnormal (see below). We would also like to stress that the concept of the passport is the evaluation of a sequence of samples and not an individual test. This can lead to apparently normal samples being part of abnormal sequences.

2. Are there samples in the athlete's profile that in your opinion are abnormal (or that form part of an abnormal sequence indicative of blood doping) in addition to those concluded by the RUSADA Commission? If so, which

We again refer to our reports in the first evaluation of the profile in 2012: G. d'Onofrio had additionally highlighted the abnormality of sample 3, M. Audran raised concerns about the sequence of samples 3 and 4 ("The HGB increase of 28 g/l between 16/07 and 27/08 /11 can't be physiologic", line 4 of his comments dated 13.6.2012), which is echoed by the comments of Y.O. Schumacher "It is of note that the sample obtained after this training camp (sample 3) is much lower in Haemoglobin concentration than sample 5" (page 2 last paragraph of the comments dated 7.6.2012).

In the same context, there is another sample with the same features (i.e. a low haemoglobin concentration, but virtually suppressed reticulocytes), which was not available at the time of our initial review in June 2012, as it was only obtained in August of the same year. This test (sample 10) displays the same pattern than sample 3 highlighted above, namely low haemoglobin concentration with virtually suppressed reticulocytes: Typically, low reticulocytes are observed if red cell mass is supraphysiologically elevated and endogenous red cell production subsequently suppressed. There are not many other causes for this feature; one would be the infection with bone marrow-bound viruses, such as Parvovirus B19 (unlikely in this case). Thus, it is very possible that the reticulocyte measures in these samples mirror the true red cell mass of the athlete at this point and that the haemoglobin readings have been manipulated through hyperhydration or other techniques ...: Haemoglobin concentration (measured in g/dL) is a concentration based measure and will change if the intravascular fluid content of the body changes. In contrast, reticulocytes are measured as a percentage (%) of mature red cells and are thus independent of any fluid changes.

Both tests (sample 3 and 10) have been obtained in the lead up to major competitions and reticulocyte% is very low for both (0.25 and 0.34%, very different from the other samples of the athlete). We therefore also deem these tests as suspicious, as they display a suppressed erythropoiesis despite low haemoglobin concentration, which might point towards the use of a haemodilution technique to mask high haemoglobin concentration.

3. *Is the athlete's profile in Appendix 5 for the preceding period 17.05.07 – 29.08.07 indicative of blood doping? Is the athlete's profile for this period consistent with the profile you considered for the purposes of the ABP review process?*

For the preceding period, two samples are available; both samples have been obtained prior to major competitions (European and World Championships 2007). Both tests show a typical OFF pattern with high haemoglobin concentration and low reticulocytes, indicating a supraphysiologically increased red cell mass which has led to a suppression of the endogenous erythropoiesis. Such pattern is pathognomonic and typically observed after the use and discontinuation of an erythropoietic stimulant or the application of a blood transfusion.

The feature is identical with the key abnormalities highlighted in the ABP profile, for example in samples 1 and 5.

iii. in cases of serious, aggravated doping violations, IAAF has always sought to punish the athletes concerned to the maximum possible extent to reflect their serious offences, including the disqualification of results, and no “fairness exception” was applied. In the Appellant’s opinion, to do otherwise in the case of the Athlete would mean to act inconsistently and to send a dangerous message to the athletics community. In that respect, IAAF makes reference to the cases of:

- Kelli White, who in 2004 admitted to the repeated use of a number of performance enhancing substances and doping methods, and accepted a 2 year ineligibility sanction starting on 17 May 2004. In addition to her ineligibility, all of her competitive results from 15 December 2000 onwards were disqualified and she forfeited her World Championship titles in 2003;
- Marion Jones, who in 2007 admitted having regularly used steroids from September 2000 through to July 2001 (including at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games), and accepted a 2 year sanction starting on 8 October 2007. In addition to her ineligibility, all of her competitive results from 1 September 2000 onwards were disqualified and she forfeited all of her World Championship titles, as well as the 5 Olympic medals that she won at the 2000 Olympic Games;
- 7 Russian athletes, who in 2009 were found (through the use of DNA evidence) to have tampered with their out-of-competition urine samples by using substitute urines, and were each banned for a period of 2 years and 9 months starting from 3 September 2008. In addition, all of the athletes’ competitive results were disqualified going back to April or May 2007, when the respective tampering of the samples had taken place;
- 37 athletes, who, since the IAAF’s introduction of the ABP program in 2009, have been found guilty of blood doping. In addition to serving their respective periods of ineligibility, all 37 athletes have, without exception, had their results disqualified

as from the date of their first violation;

- doping offenders in other sports, and namely of:
 - √ Jan Ullrich, who in 2010 was found guilty of a first anti-doping rule violation for the use of blood doping and other prohibited substances and was banned from the sport for a period of 2 years starting from 22 August 2011. As regards his career results, the Panel took the view that his involvement in Dr Fuentes' doping program in Spain had extended back as far as the spring of 2005 and it therefore disqualified all of his results from 1 May 2005 until the time of his retirement in 2007;
 - √ Lance Armstrong, who in August 2012 was banned for life from the sport of cycling for his involvement in the US Postal Service Team doping conspiracy and all of his career results from 1 August 1998 were disqualified without exception, including numerous Tour de France and other international titles;

iv. only in cases of “re-testing” (such as the case of Ms Kotova mentioned by RUSADA in its submissions: § 84 below) did IAAF deviate from this approach.

70. The IAAF's primary case, therefore, is that this Panel is not bound to apply the test adopted in the case CAS 2010/A/2235 of 21 April 2001, invoked in the Decision, namely, that it would be unfair to disqualify the Athlete's results not likely to have been affected by the anti-doping rule violation. In the Athlete's case, and as mentioned, there are no grounds for applying the “fairness exception” in Article 40.9 of the 2015 IAAF ADR. In the IAAF's opinion, the damage that the Athlete has caused to the sport of athletics should outweigh any possible consideration of fairness in his favour. Accordingly, the IAAF submits that all of the Athlete's results from 25 February 2011 should be disqualified.
71. In the alternative, the IAAF submits that, if the Panel were to find that the “fairness exception” in Article 40.9 of the 2015 IAAF ADR applies, the Panel should then nevertheless still disqualify (as the CAS Panel did in the case CAS 2010/A/2235) all results obtained between the first and the last identified abnormal samples in his profile, plus a period of one month following the last abnormal sample. The IAAF contends that an athlete, who makes a conscious decision to manipulate his blood, believes that he has escaped detection through routine controls, and repeats the illegal act should not have any of the results he achieved between those two (or more) episodes of manipulation recognised. Applying such an approach in the Athlete's case, the Panel should take into account that there is a consensus of expert opinions that the first abnormal sample in the Athlete's profile is sample 1 from 25 February 2011 and the evidence of the IAAF experts is that the last abnormal sample in the profile should be considered to be sample 10, namely, the Athlete's sample at the 2012 Olympic Games on 3 August 2012. Therefore, all of the Athlete's results between 25 February 2011 and 3 September 2012 should be disqualified.

72. Finally, if the Panel were to find that the correct test is to disqualify only those of the Athlete's results, which may have been affected by his respective violations, the IAAF submits that, in addition to the results disqualified by the Anti-Doping Committee, at a minimum the Athlete's results at the 2011 European Race Walking Cup and at the 2012 Olympic Games should also be disqualified, because they have been shown to be associated with samples that the IAAF experts have determined to be abnormal as evidence of blood doping.

b. The Position of the Respondents

b.1 The Position of the First Respondent

73. In its prayers for relief, ARAF requested the CAS to rule as follows:
- i. decision of the RUSADA Committee 6/2015 dated January, 20, 2015, is upheld;*
 - ii. in any event, the ARAF shall not bear any of the costs of this arbitration;*
 - iii. the Appellant (the IAAF) and/or Mr Vladimir Kanaikin shall be ordered to reimburse the ARAF for the legal and other costs incurred in connection with this arbitration, in an amount to be determined at the discretion of the CAS Panel".*
74. In other words, the First Respondent asks this Panel to dismiss the appeal brought by IAAF against the Decision, which ARAF finds to be *"grounded, well-founded and reasonable"*.
75. In support of such conclusion, ARAF submits the following:
- i. the Anti-Doping Committee took into account that:
 - the Athlete's first abnormal blood sample was collected on 25 February 2011,
 - the disqualification of competitive results means that an athlete is considered as never having participated in that competition,
 - the Athlete was provisionally suspended from 17 December 2012, and later declared ineligible for life, so that the disqualification of all results from 25 February 2011 is not fair,
 - the "fairness" principle recognized by Article 40.9 of the 2015 IAAF ADR had to be applied in the Athlete's case;
 - ii. all opinions expressed by the experts appointed by IAAF and RUSADA were carefully considered, and it was decided that a sample could be considered to be abnormal only when 5 of the 6 opinions described it as being abnormal, bearing in mind the seriousness of the allegations, the burden and standard of proof and the necessity to interpret in the Athlete's favour all doubts or uncertainties;
 - iii. the Anti-Doping Committee, on such basis considered samples 1, 4 and 5 to be abnormal;
 - iv. the CAS jurisprudence allows the *"selective disqualification"* of competitive results. In fact, in the case CAS 2010/A/2235, the CAS Panel disqualified only those results which had been likely affected by the anti-doping rule violation, and indicated that such a

disqualification might extend no more than one month after the last abnormal sample. On this basis, the Anti-Doping Committee disqualified the Athlete's competitive results achieved during the period commencing one month before and ending one month after the date of collection of each abnormal sample.

76. As a result, in the First Respondent's opinion, the Decision was issued "*in strict compliance with the IAAF Anti-Doping Rules (ed. 2015), including 'fairness' principle, lex mitior principle, and was based on existing information, IAAF's and RUSADA's experts' opinions, CAS jurisprudence*".

b.2 The Position of the Second Respondent

77. In his prayers for relief, the Athlete requested the CAS to:
1. *To reject the Appellant's appeal;*
 2. *To confirm RUSADA's decision of 20 January 2015; or*
 3. *In the alternative to declare that the samples 3, 9 and 10 are not abnormal; and to declare that no other results of the Respondent 2 than the results during the periods 25 January 2011 – 25 March 2011 and 16 June 2011 – 27 September 2011 shall be disqualified; or*
 4. *In the further alternative to declare that the Respondent 2's results at the 2011 European Race Walking Cup on 21 May 2011, Russian Winter Meeting on 5 February 2012, IAAF World Race Walking Cup of 12 May 2012 and the Olympic Games 2012 shall not be disqualified; and*
 5. *To order the Appellant to pay the costs that the Respondent 2 has incurred in this appeal procedure".*
78. Preliminarily, as contended in the course of the arbitration, the Second Respondent argues that the appeal should be dismissed because CAS lacks jurisdiction to hear it. This contention, raised in a letter of 27 November 2015 and confirmed at the hearing, results from WADA's declaration that RUSADA had to suspend all anti-doping activities under the WADC and from IAAF's suspension of ARAF: "*this means that RUSADA [and ARAF] cannot defend the decision against which the Appellant appealed*". In addition, according to the Second Respondent "*a suspension lift the arbitration clause as RUSADA is no longer considered by WADA as a party and does not have any rights in these proceedings. Therefore, WADA's decision affected the arbitration clause and Respondents do not accept CAS jurisdiction anymore*". In such connection, the Second Respondent underlined at the hearing that he had only agreed to submit to CAS disputes with ARAF and RUSADA: their absence from the proceedings affects his consent to arbitrate.
79. On the merits the Second Respondent argues that the Decision should be upheld, because:
- i. it is not proven that the Athlete violated the anti-doping rules during the 2011 European Race Walking Cup, the 2012 Russian Winter Indoor Meeting, the 2012 World Race Walking Cup and the 2012 Olympic Games, and
 - ii. the principle of fairness has to be applied in this case, so that the Athlete's results at the 2011 European Race Walking Cup, the 2012 Russian Winter Indoor Meeting, the 2012 World Race Walking Cup and the 2012 Olympic Games should not be disqualified.

80. With regard to the first point (*“No violation of the anti-doping rules with respect to the European Race Walking Cup, Russian Winter Meeting, World Race Walking Cup, Olympic Games”*), the Second Respondent submits:

- i. as to the burden and standard of proof, that IAAF must establish, to the *“comfortable satisfaction”* of the hearing body, that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred. In order to satisfy this burden at the required standard, *“good and clear evidence”* is to be provided. The Athlete in any case underlines that the *“comfortable satisfaction”* standard is harshly criticised, and that many authors seek the application of the stricter standard of *“beyond reasonable doubt”*;
- ii. as to the evidence, that the ABP constitutes only an indirect method for the detection of anti-doping rule violations and that in many cases, including those mentioned by the Appellant, the anti-doping authority relied not only on the ABP evaluation, but also on other indirect and/or circumstantial evidence to conclude that an anti-doping rule violation had been committed. The Second Respondent considers that the possibility of basing a finding of an anti-doping rule violation only on the ABP is currently heavily criticized and serious doubts as to the reliability of the ABP when used alone have been raised. Relying on the ABP only would imply using an evidentiary standard so low as to be inconsistent with the right to a fair trial; in the scientific literature it is contested that this method is scientifically sound enough; the fact that only three experts review the ABP profile is also heavily criticized; the review process lacks transparency, since the content of expert reports is not accessible to non-specialists;
- iii. that the probability for a sample to be qualified as abnormal has to amount to 99.9%: here, the probability of 99.9% regarding samples 3, 9 and 10 is clearly not met. The six experts tasked by IAAF and RUSADA to evaluate the Athlete’s ABP could not unanimously agree on what samples are abnormal: samples 1, 4 and 5 were considered to be abnormal by five experts, samples 2 and 3 by three experts, sample 6 by two experts, and sample 10 by only one expert. As a result, samples 3, 9 and 10 are not conclusive, since the probability of 99.9% is not reached, and do not allow the conclusion that the Athlete committed an anti-doping rule violation before, during or after the competitions at stake. In addition, *“samples 2 and 8 are not abnormal either”*.

81. With regard to the second point (*“Fairness”*), the Second Respondent contends:

- i. in general terms, that the concept of fairness, *“nowhere defined”*, is however *“broad”*, as stated in case CAS 2013/A/3274. It is not an *“exception”*, but a *“general principle”*, which requires that all elements of a case be taken into account, even when not specifically mentioned. As a result, a measure can be considered to be unfair, from a substantive point of view, when it is disproportionate; in the same way, it would be unfair to disqualify results not affected by an anti-doping rule violation;
- ii. as to Article 40.9 of the 2015 IAAF ADR, that the fairness principle had to be introduced in this provision because, an athlete could otherwise be sanctioned automatically for one anti-doping rule violation in three ways: automatic disqualification from the competition

in question, period of ineligibility and automatic retroactive disqualification of any results past the collection of the first positive sample. By adding the principle of fairness, an automatic retroactive disqualification can be avoided: it is only fair for everyone if an athlete is disqualified from the competition during which he was under the influence of a prohibited substance or method. However, it would be unfair to the athlete concerned that the automatic and retroactive disqualification apply in any circumstances. In addition, Article 40.1, second paragraph of the 2015 IAAF ADR also allows the results not to be disqualified under certain circumstances, in particular when the results were not influenced by the anti-doping rule violation. Furthermore, it might be unfair to base disqualifications on indirect methods/evidence such as the ABP only. In the case CAS 2010/A/2235, the CAS Panel explained well the problem of using the ABP as the only evidence for the use of prohibited methods or substances: *“Although the provisions as to disqualification are expressly made applicable to violations consisting of use of prohibited method, they are not easy to apply where the proof of such violation is to be found by reference to the ABP. The provisions are geared to the situation where the violation is an occurrence rather than a process, most obviously where the violation is the presence of a prohibited substance”*. In summary, Article 40.9 of the 2015 IAAF ADR was modified precisely to mitigate this difficulty and take into account the principle of proportionality and to respect the athlete’s personality. As a result, *“the principle of fairness shall not be considered as an exception but as a condition: if fairness does require otherwise, Rule 40.9 of the IAAF Anti-Doping Rules 2015 shall not apply”*;

- iii. as to the burden of proof in this respect, that, contrary to the Appellant’s position in its appeal brief, the Second Respondent does not bear the burden of proof under Article 40.9 of the 2015 IAAF ADR. Rather, the anti-doping organization that accuses the athlete of doping must prove to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel that fairness *“does not require otherwise”*, i.e. that all competitive results obtained by the athlete from the date of the anti-doping rule violation, through the commencement of the ineligibility period have to be disqualified;
- iv. as to the application of the principle of fairness, that:
 - the Decision is solely based on the ABP evidence, i.e. only on indirect evidence, not considered by all experts as a reliable mean to clearly establish an anti-doping violation. Moreover, the expert reports in which the ABP of the Athlete was analysed are not conclusive as to what specific sample is abnormal and as to whether the Athlete was under the influence of a doping method during the 2011 European Race Walking Cup, the 2012 Russian Winter Indoor Meeting, the 2012 World Race Walking Cup and the 2012 Olympic Games. The six experts do not all agree regarding what sample should be qualified as abnormal. It is unfair to punish the Second Respondent with an additional sanction if it is not proven that he was under the influence of a prohibited substance or prohibited method during the competition;
 - it cannot be forgotten that the Second Respondent was never before found guilty of an anti-doping rule violation and thus that this case is the Second Respondent’s first offence;
 - the Appellant is *“trying to dramatize”* the case *“by falsely accusing”* the Athlete of prior

violations in 2008 and 2009. However, the Second Respondent never committed such violations and the Appellant cannot prove these violations (especially because the WADA Athlete Blood Profile Operating Guidelines came into force only on 1 December 2009, so that no anti-doping violation can be, even indirectly, proven prior to this date);

- the Second Respondent has already been punished with severe sanctions having an important impact on his life and career: to impose additional disqualifications is clearly disproportionate and thus unfair;
- the samples were collected between 2010 and 2012 and the competitions at stake took place in 2011 and 2012. Thus, the proceedings have been ongoing for more than six years. The Second Respondent is not responsible for this delay and it would be unfair to sanction him with additional disqualification so late.

b.3 The Position of the Third Respondent

82. In its prayers for relief, the RUSADA requested that the CAS rule as follows:

- i. decision of the RUSADA Commission is upheld;*
- ii. alternatively if the CAS Panel decides that samples 3 and 10 are abnormal Mr Kanaikin's results on 20 May 2011 and 3 August 2012 plus an additional period of one month are disqualified;*
- iii. if the decision of the RUSADA Commission is upheld, IAAF reimburses RUSADA all the costs;*
- iv. alternatively ARAF and Mr Vladimir Kanaikin shall bear all the costs".*

83. According to RUSADA, the disputed questions in this arbitration are:

- i. "who shall prove the principle of "fairness" (the athlete or the RUSADA commission on its own)", and*
- ii. "if there were exceptional circumstances that required application of "fairness" principle in this case".*

84. Concerning the first point, RUSADA underlines that Article 40.9 of the 2015 IAAF ADR provides no indications as to who bears the burden of proving the applicability of the "fairness principle" in any given case. However, RUSADA refers to the correspondence sent by IAAF in another case (the case of Ms Kotova), in which IAAF would have agreed that the "fairness principle" can be applied at the discretion of the hearing body, without any burden for the athlete to invoke or prove it.

85. Concerning the second point, RUSADA emphasizes that:

- i. the selective disqualification of results decided by the Anti-Doping Committee is fair both for the Athlete and the clean athletes who competed against him, since the results that were achieved by unfair means have been disqualified, while those results that were not affected by the use of prohibited substances or methods have been left untouched;
- ii. it is not possible to use the data of samples collected in 2007-2009 to claim that the Athlete

engaged in a doping scheme over a long period, even before the first sample was entered into his ABP, since:

- the data from samples collected before 1 December 2009 (when the ABP program became applicable) cannot be used to bring charges and cannot be taken into account due to their questionable scientific reliability, as they were analysed under other laboratory reporting requirements;
 - IAAF did not bring any charge against the Athlete based on those data, and waited for additional tests over several years without proceeding;
 - all the experts involved in the review of the Athlete's blood values specified the samples and the periods affected by the use of prohibited substances or methods – which means that other samples and periods were within the physiological limits;
- iii. the decision of the Anti-Doping Committee, not to consider samples 3 and 10 as abnormal, because only those samples so declared by at least five of the six experts involved were considered to be abnormal, was in line with the applicable standard of evidence imposed on the anti-doping organization to establish an anti-doping rule violation, and took into account the severity of the consequences that would have derived for the Athlete, including disqualification of results at major sporting events.

3. LEGAL ANALYSIS

3.1 Jurisdiction

86. CAS has jurisdiction according to Article R47 of the Code, under which:

“an appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body may be filed with the CAS insofar as the statutes or regulations of the said body so provide or as the parties have concluded a specific arbitration agreement ...”.

87. More specifically, the jurisdiction of CAS is based on Article 42 of the 2015 IAAF ADR, in force at the time the Decision was rendered and the appeal to CAS was filed, which reads, in the pertinent parts, as follows:

Article 42 – “Appeals”

Decisions subject to Appeal

1. *Unless specifically stated otherwise, all decisions made under these Anti-Doping Rules may be appealed in accordance with the provisions set out below. All such decisions shall remain in effect while under appeal unless the appellate body orders otherwise or unless otherwise determined in accordance with these Rules Before an appeal is commenced, any post-decision review provided in these Anti-Doping Rules must be exhausted*

(a) Scope of Review Not Limited: the scope of review on appeal includes all issues relevant to the

matter and is expressly not limited to the issues or scope of review before the initial decision maker.

- (b) *CAS Shall Not Defer To The Findings Being Appealed: in making its decision, CAS need not give deference to the discretion exercised by the body whose decision is being appealed.*

Appeals from Decisions regarding Anti-Doping Rule Violations or Consequences

2. *The following is a non-exhaustive list of decisions regarding anti-doping rule violations and Consequences that may be appealed under these Rules: ... a decision imposing Consequences or not imposing Consequences for an anti-doping rule violation; ... a decision failing to impose Consequences for an anti-doping rule violation in accordance with these Rules;*

Appeals arising from International Competitions or Involving International-Level Athletes

3. *In cases arising from an International Competition or involving International-Level Athletes or their Athlete Support Personnel, the first instance decision of the relevant body of the Member shall not be subject to further review at national level and shall be appealed exclusively to CAS in accordance with the provisions set out below.*

Parties Entitled to Appeal

5. *In any case arising out of an International Competition or involving an International-Level Athlete or his Athlete Support Personnel, the following parties shall have the right to appeal to CAS:*
- (c) *the IAAF;*

Time Limits for Filing Appeals to CAS

15. *Unless stated otherwise in these Rules ..., the appellant shall have forty-five (45) days in which to file his statement of appeal with CAS, such period starting from the day after the date of receipt of the decision to be appealed (or where the IAAF is the prospective appellant, from the day after the date of receipt of both the decision to be appealed and the complete file relating to the decision, in English or French) Within fifteen days of the deadline for filing the statement of appeal, the appellant shall file his appeal brief with CAS and, within thirty days of receipt of the appeal brief, the respondent shall file his answer with CAS.*

Respondents to the CAS Appeal

18. *As a general rule, the respondent to a CAS appeal shall be the party which has taken the decision that is subject to appeal. Where the Member has delegated the conduct of a hearing under these Rules to another body, committee or tribunal ..., the respondent to the CAS appeal against such decision shall be the Member.*
19. *Where the IAAF is appellant before CAS, it shall be entitled to join as additional respondent(s) to the appeal such other parties as it deems to be appropriate, including the Athlete, Athlete Support Personnel or other Person or entity that may be affected by the decision.*

The CAS Appeal

22. *All appeals before CAS shall take the form of a re-hearing and the CAS Panel shall be able to substitute its decision for the decision of the relevant tribunal of the Member or the IAAF where it considers the decision of the relevant tribunal of the Member or the IAAF to be erroneous or procedurally unsound. The CAS Panel may in any case add to or increase the Consequences that were imposed in the contested decision.*
 23. *In all CAS appeals involving the IAAF, CAS and the CAS Panel shall be bound by the IAAF Constitution, Rules and Regulations (including the Anti-Doping Regulations). In the case of any conflict between the CAS rules currently in force and the IAAF Constitution, Rules and Regulations, the IAAF Constitution, Rules and Regulations shall take precedence.*
 24. *In all CAS appeals involving the IAAF, the governing law shall be Monegasque law and the arbitrations shall be conducted in English, unless the parties agree otherwise.*
 25. *The CAS Panel may in appropriate cases award a party its costs, or a contribution to its costs, incurred in the CAS appeal.*
 26. *The decision of CAS shall be final and binding on all parties, and on all Members, and no right of appeal will lie from the CAS decision. The CAS decision shall have immediate effect and all Members shall take all necessary action to ensure that it is effective”.*
88. The First Respondent and the Third Respondent expressly accepted CAS jurisdiction, by signing the Order of Procedure. On the other hand, the Second Respondent, who had not raised any objection in this respect and had filed his submissions on the merits of the dispute, challenged CAS jurisdiction during the proceedings, when (i) RUSADA announced that it had been suspended by WADA and that it had to stay any anti-doping related activity, and (ii) IAAF suspended ARAF’s status of member federation. More specifically, the Second Respondent invoked the suspension of RUSADA and ARAF to deny CAS jurisdiction because (i) RUSADA and ARAF could not defend the Decision; and (ii) the Second Respondent only agreed to submit to CAS disputes with ARAF and RUSADA, meaning that their absence from the proceedings would affect his consent to arbitrate.
89. IAAF defined such objection as “*parasitic*”, “*vexatious*”, “*opportunistic*”, corresponding to an “*inappropriate procedural conduct*”. In the Panel’s opinion, this objection is frivolous and must be rejected.
90. First, the Second Respondent grounded his objection on the impossibility for RUSADA and ARAF to take part in the arbitration and defend the Decision. However, RUSADA and ARAF did take part in the arbitration in defence of the Decision: their position as parties was not under any point of view affected by WADA’s and IAAF’s suspension; no issue was raised as to their ongoing existence as legal entities, with full capacity to act in arbitration proceedings; WADA and IAAF confirmed they could appear as respondents; RUSADA and ARAF accepted CAS jurisdiction and did not raise the objection voiced by the Athlete.

91. Second, the Second Respondent contended that he only agreed to submit to arbitration disputes with ARAF and RUSADA, meaning that their absence from the proceedings would affect his consent to arbitrate. However, as mentioned, RUSADA and ARAF participated in the arbitration without objecting to CAS jurisdiction. In any case, the Second Respondent's contention does not correspond to the provisions in the IAAF ADR defining CAS jurisdiction over this arbitration. Under those rules, and specifically pursuant to Article 42.19 of the 2015 IAAF ADR, the Athlete agreed to arbitrate disputes with IAAF, and not with RUSADA and/or ARAF: ARAF was named as a respondent by IAAF in accordance with Article 42.18 of the 2015 IAAF ADR, and RUSADA is not a necessary party in such arbitration.
92. As a result, the Second Respondent's objection must be rejected because it is devoid of any merits.

3.2 Appeal Proceedings

93. As these proceedings involve an appeal against a decision rendered by RUSADA, brought on the basis of provisions contained in the statutes of an international federation, they are considered and treated as appeal arbitration proceedings in a disciplinary case heard by a national anti-doping organization, within the meaning and for purposes of the Code.

3.3 Admissibility

94. The statement of appeal was filed within the deadline set in Article 42.15 of the 2015 IAAF ADR, counted from the day of receipt by IAAF of the Decision. Accordingly, the appeal is admissible.

3.4 Scope of the Panel's Review

95. According to Article R57 of the Code,

"the Panel shall have full power to review the facts and the law. It may issue a new decision which replaces the decision challenged or annul the decision and refer the case back to the previous instance. ...".

96. Article 42.15 of the 2015 IAAF ADR confirms in that regard that:

"All appeals before CAS shall take the form of a re-hearing and the CAS Panel shall be able to substitute its decision for the decision of the relevant tribunal of the Member or the IAAF where it considers the decision of the relevant tribunal of the Member or the IAAF to be erroneous or procedurally unsound. The CAS Panel may in any case add to or increase the Consequences that were imposed in the contested decision".

3.5 Applicable Law

97. The law applicable in the present arbitration is identified by the Panel in accordance with Article R58 of the Code.

98. Pursuant to Article R58 of the Code, the Panel is required to decide the dispute

“... according to the applicable regulations and, subsidiarily, to the rules of law chosen by the parties or, in the absence of such a choice, according to the law of the country in which the federation, association or sports-related body which has issued the challenged decision is domiciled or according to the rules of law, the application of which the Panel deems appropriate. In the latter case, the Panel shall give reasons for its decision”.

99. Pursuant to Article 42.23 of the 2015 IAAF ADR (and to Article 42.22 of the 2009 IAAF ADR):

“In all CAS appeals involving the IAAF, CAS and the CAS Panel shall be bound by the IAAF Constitution, Rules and Regulations (including the Anti-Doping Regulations). In the case of any conflict between the CAS rules currently in force and the IAAF Constitution, Rules and Regulations, the IAAF Constitution, Rules and Regulations shall take precedence”.

100. In accordance, then, with Article 42.23 of the 2015 IAAF ADR (and to Article 42.22 of the 2009 IAAF ADR):

“In all CAS appeals involving the IAAF, the governing law shall be Monegasque law”.

101. As a result, pursuant to Article R58 of the Code, this Panel will apply primarily the IAAF rules and regulations, and subsidiarily Monegasque law.

102. The IAAF provisions set by the IAAF ADR which are relevant in this arbitration include the following:

- i. from the 2009 IAAF ADR:

Article 40.9 – *“Disqualification of Results in Competitions Subsequent to Sample Collection or Commission of an Anti-Doping Rule Violation”*

“In addition to the automatic disqualification of the results in the Competition which produced the positive sample under Rules 39 and 40, all other competitive results obtained from the date the positive Sample was collected (whether In-Competition or Out-of-Competition) or other anti-doping rule violation occurred through to the commencement of any Provisional Suspension or Ineligibility period shall be Disqualified with all of the resulting Consequences for the Athlete including the forfeiture of any titles, awards, medals, points and prize and appearance money”;

- ii. from the 2015 IAAF ADR:

Article 40.9 – *“Disqualification of Individual Results in Competitions Subsequent to Sample Collection or Commission of an Anti-Doping Rule Violation”*

“In addition to the automatic Disqualification of the Athlete’s individual results in the Competition which produced the positive sample under Rules 39 and 40, all other competitive results obtained by the Athlete from the date the positive Sample was Collected (whether In-Competition or Out-of-Competition) or other anti-doping rule violation occurred, through to the commencement of any Provisional Suspension or Ineligibility period shall, unless fairness requires otherwise, be Disqualified with all of the resulting

Consequences for the Athlete including the forfeiture of any titles, awards, medals, points and prize and appearance money”.

3.6 The Dispute

103. The object of the dispute, as already underlined, is the portion of the Decision (point 3) which, “pursuant to the Art. 40.9” of the 2015 IAAF ADR “and taking into account fairness and proportionality”, disqualified the competitive results of the Athlete in two different periods (25 January 2011 – 25 March 2011 and 16 June 2011 – 27 September 2011), corresponding to periods starting one month before and ending one month after the date of collection of those samples entered into the Athlete’s ABP that the Anti-Doping Committee conclusively found to be abnormal, *i.e.* sample 1 of 25 February 2011, sample 4 of 16 July 2011 and sample 5 of 27 August 2011. IAAF challenges this “selective” disqualification of results, submitting, in its primary claim, that all results achieved by the Athlete from the date of his first abnormal sample (25 February 2011) to the date he accepted a provisional suspension (17 December 2012) must be disqualified, including those obtained in the 20Km walk competition on 21 May 2011 at the 2011 European Race Walking Cup (where the Athlete ranked first), on 5 February 2012 at the 2012 Russian Winter Indoor Meeting (where the Athlete was second in the 50Km race walk competition), on 12 May 2012 at the 2012 World Race Walking Cup (where the Athlete ranked second) and on 4 August 2012 at the 2012 Olympic Games.
104. With respect to the other portions of the Decision:
 - the finding, on the basis of the 2009 IAAF ADR, that the Athlete committed an anti-doping rule violation (point 1) remained unchallenged, and is therefore final;
 - the measure of the ineligibility period to be applied to the Athlete for such anti-doping rule violation, set in a life ban in the Decision (point 2), however not challenged in the IAAF’s appeal to CAS, is to be reduced to a period of 8 years (measure consistent with the 2015 IAAF ADR), starting from the date of the Athlete’s provisional suspension (17 December 2017), pursuant to the parties’ agreement, expressed at the hearing.
105. As a result, the main issue that this Panel has to decide is whether the Decision was correct in disqualifying only some of the results achieved by the Athlete in the period following the date on which the anti-doping rule violation was found to have been committed and the beginning of the period of (provisional) suspension/ineligibility. In this connection, the parties brought some other incidental issues to the attention of the Panel during the course of the arbitration: *inter alia*, the identification of the rules which have to be applied, and, if relevant, the meaning and conditions of application of the “fairness exception” mentioned at Article 40.9 of the 2015 IAAF ADR.
106. In this context, the Second Respondent took issue with the use of the ABP as a method for identifying anti-doping rule violations. Contrary to the Appellant’s objections, the Panel considers that this issue is relevant even though this arbitration concerns only the disqualification of results and not the unchallenged and therefore final finding of an anti-doping

rule violation, which was based on the abnormal profile shown by the Athlete's ABP. Indeed, consistent with the Decision's approach, which the Second Respondent defends and wishes to be confirmed, the criticism as to the reliability of the ABP can be understood as aiming to show that insufficient evidence has been submitted to prove that some of the samples included in the ABP of the Athlete are abnormal, and therefore to allow the conclusion, from the Athlete's perspective, that they should not be taken into account when determining whether the results achieved in the period surrounding those disputed samples have to be disqualified. In the same way, the Second Respondent appears to invoke the alleged unreliability of the ABP method as a factor to be taken into account when assessing, in general terms, the "fairness" of the disqualification (or of the non-disqualification) of results. In such regard (but only within those limits), the Athlete's submissions are admissible and relevant: on the other hand, they would not be (and indeed are not) admissible to the extent they were (or are) intended to dispute the foundation of those points of the Decision which are final. By not challenging (and indeed by defending) the Decision, the Athlete accepts the conclusion that his ABP gave sufficient evidence, at least with respect to some of the samples, to ground the conclusion that he committed an anti-doping rule violation.

107. At the same time, but conversely, the Panel notes that no other procedural issues remain to be addressed, except for confirming and explaining some directions issued in the course of the proceedings. The Second Respondent, who quite strongly criticized the Panel, for instance, with respect to the hearing of the expert witnesses, in the end waived his objections, recognizing (at least in this regard) that his right to be heard and to be treated equally had been respected.
108. The Panel, therefore, can turn to the examination of the main issue that has to be decided: was the Decision correct in the portion in which it disqualified only some, and not all, of the results achieved by the Athlete after the date of commission of the anti-doping rule violation for which he was found guilty?
109. As said, in order to answer such question, the Panel was requested to identify, first, the rules which apply for a decision on the disqualification of the Athlete's results. The IAAF ADR have evolved over the years: at the time the anti-doping rule violation was committed (*i.e.*, in the period covered by the Athlete's ABP: July 2010 – October 2012), the 2009 IAAF ADR were in force¹⁴; when the Decision was adopted (on 20 January 2015), the 2015 IAAF ADR had become applicable.
110. Taking into account such evolution, and as already underlined, the Anti-Doping Committee decided to apply (i) the 2009 IAAF ADR, defined to be the "Old Rules", to the issue of liability (finding of an anti-doping rule violation) and to the determination of one of the consequences of the established liability (ineligibility period), and (ii) the 2015 IAAF ADR, defined to be the "New Rules", to another consequence of the same finding (disqualification of results). Such peculiar conclusion was reached by invoking the "*tempus regit actum*" principle to justify the application of the 2009 IAAF ADR, and the "*lex mitior*" principle to explain the application of

¹⁴ See the preceding footnote 13: the reference to the 2009 IAAF ADR is intended to cover also those editions of the IAAF ADR which followed them and preceded the 2015 IAAF ADR.

the 2015 IAAF ADR. Article 40.9 of the latter, while providing for the disqualification of results (in the same way as Article 40.9 of the 2009 IAAF ADR), allows, unlike the former, the non-disqualification for reasons of “fairness”. The most recent version of the IAAF ADR was thus considered to be more favourable to the Athlete, and was consequently applied as “*lex mitior*”. The Anti-Doping Committee therefore found *ex officio* the existence of reasons of “fairness” to disqualify only some of the Athlete’s results; with the consequence that the results achieved by the Athlete at the 2011 World Championships and at the 2012 Olympic Games were left untouched.

111. The Appellant disputes this approach. Even though it had accepted in its written submissions that the issue of the disqualification of the Athlete’s results should be governed by the 2015 IAAF ADR, the Appellant took issue on this point, at the hearing, clarifying that precedents of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Swiss Federal Tribunal indicate that the “*lex mitior*” principle was improperly applied. The Appellant argued that the hearing body cannot undertake a rule-by-rule comparison of the two systems (the 2009 IAAF ADR and the 2015 IAAF ADR), picking the most favourable rule of each system, because it would thereby create a new *ad hoc* disciplinary regime composed of a miscellany of rules deriving from different systems. The Appellant added that the Anti-Doping Committee should have, and the CAS now must, apply whichever of the 2009 or the 2015 system is most favourable for the accused, without picking individual provisions from each. The Decision is wrong because it mixed provisions from both the 2009 and 2015 system. However, the Appellant concedes that in the case of the Athlete it is possible to make a global reference to the 2015 IAAF ADR for the definition of all consequences to be derived from his anti-doping rule violation, including (in addition to the definition of the ineligibility period: §§ **Error! Reference source not found.**(ii)(a) and **Error! Reference source not found.** above) the disqualification of results. Therefore, the Appellant concedes that the “fairness exception” contained in the 2015 IAAF ADR, globally more favourable to the Athlete, could apply *in abstracto*, even if it should not in the specific circumstances.
112. The Respondents did not raise any objection to the admissibility of the Appellant’s submission of this new line of reasoning, simply insisting that the “fairness exception” should apply also in the context of the 2009 IAAF ADR, because it is a general principle enshrined also in that edition of the IAAF ADR, and expressed in the WADC.
113. On such basis, the question before the Panel is whether the “fairness exception” (within the meaning to be further specified) is also to be read into the 2009 IAAF ADR, as a general principle or as a result of a reference to the 2015 IAAF ADR, including its version of Article 40.9, pursuant to the “*lex mitior*” principle.
114. The Panel sees the force of the IAAF argument that specific rules cannot be picked from different systems. The *lex mitior* principle prevents the continued applicability of a disciplinary rule after it has been replaced by a more lenient one, and reflects, in favour of the accused, the evolution of a legislative policy, which translates into rules the opinion that the same infringement is less severe than it was previously perceived. However, this principle cannot be applied in a way that creates a law that never existed, composed of a mixture of old and new

rules and upsetting the rationale of both systems.

115. At the same time, the Panel, even though it remains unpersuaded, cannot exclude as *prima facie* misplaced the Respondents' arguments regarding the possibility of applying a general principle of "fairness" in deciding whether some results are to be left untouched, even in the absence of an explicit rule to this effect in the 2009 IAAF ADR.
116. However, the Panel does not find it necessary to draw a conclusion on the issue of whether a "fairness exception" should be read as included in the 2009 IAAF ADR or has to be applied as a result of a reference to the 2015 IAAF ADR. Even assuming it does, the Panel would reach the same conclusion that it should not apply here, because the Panel cannot see any factors justifying a deviation from the rule of automatic disqualification set by Article 40.9 of the 2009 IAAF ADR and of the 2015 IAAF ADR.
117. In both versions, the finding of an anti-doping rule violation triggers the disqualification (i) of the results achieved in the competition which produced a positive sample, and (ii) of all other competitive results obtained in the period between (a) the date of the positive sample's collection, or of the other anti-doping rule violation, and (b) the date of commencement of the ineligibility (or provisional suspension). The version of Article 40.9 of the 2015 IAAF ADR makes clear that, while the disqualification of the results achieved at the competition which produced the positive sample is automatic and unavoidable, the disqualification of the competitive results obtained in the subsequent period applies "*unless fairness requires otherwise*", i.e. unless it is fair not to disqualify them. In other words, "fairness" should be found in order not to disqualify the results. It is therefore an exception to the general disqualification rule. In light of the provision's clear wording, the Panel therefore disagrees with the Respondents' submissions that "fairness" is a precondition to the disqualification of a result.
118. The findings (undisputed in this arbitration, and indeed never contested also before the Anti-Doping Committee) that the Second Respondent is responsible for an anti-doping rule violation (identified through the examination of his ABP) and that his anti-doping rule violation can be set (as mentioned in the Decision) at the date of the collection of sample 1 in his ABP (and therefore on 25 February 2011) thus mean that his competitive results obtained in the period between 25 February 2011 and 17 December 2012 (date on which he accepted the provisional suspension) must be disqualified, unless fairness requires otherwise.
119. The Panel finds that no reasons of fairness exist in this case that could justify mitigating the effects of Article 40.9 of the 2009 IAAF ADR. This conclusion applies irrespective of the discussion between the parties as to whether the anti-doping organization or the athlete bears the burden of proving whether it is fair to disqualify the results in question.
120. As a preliminary matter, the Panel notes that "fairness" is a broad concept (CAS 2013/A/3274, para. 85), covering a number of elements that the deciding body can take into account in its decision not to disqualify some results. The CAS precedents (in general terms, *inter alia*, CAS 2007/A/1283, para. 53; CAS 2013/A/3274, para. 85-88) took into account a number of factors, such as the nature and severity of the infringement (CAS 2010/A/2083, para. 81), the length of

time between the anti-doping rule violation, the result to be disqualified and the disciplinary decision, the presence of negative tests between the anti-doping rule violation and the competition at which the result to be disqualified was achieved, and the effect of the infringement on the result at stake (CAS 2008/A/1744, para. 76; CAS 2007/A/1362 & 1393, para 7.22). The Panel underlines that no single element is decisive alone: an overall evaluation of them is necessary.

121. In that regard, and bearing in mind the submissions of the parties:

- i. as to the characteristics of the anti-doping rule violation, the Panel notes that the Athlete engaged in continuous, intentional and severe violations of the anti-doping regulations. The point, indeed, is confirmed by the unchallenged findings in the Decision, which held three of the ten samples of the Athlete's ABP to be abnormal and imposed a life ban on the basis of aggravating circumstances. In the same vein, the Panel is comforted by the opinion of the IAAF experts filed in the course of this arbitration¹⁵, only marginally and "hypothetically" challenged by the Respondents' experts. As it has been underlined, the Athlete's ABP shows several abnormalities in nearly all the markers therein contained, indicating that the Athlete was engaged in blood doping cycles at least in 2011 and 2012. More specifically, the Panel notes, on the basis of the expert reports reviewed, that samples 2, 3 and 10 have to be considered as abnormal, in addition to those mentioned in the Decision. In particular, samples 2 and 3 show suspiciously low RET% values, which remained unexplained by the Athlete. The patterns observed between sample 2 and sample 3 and between sample 4 and sample 5, with increased HGB and depressed RET% levels, along with similarly depressed RET% values in samples 1 and 10, strongly suggest previous exogenous erythropoietic stimulation and/or blood transfusion¹⁶. In addition, the overall variation in extreme HGB values have been defined to be beyond normal physiological limits. In other words, the Athlete's case is not the "unfortunate" case of an athlete, who inadvertently ingested a contaminated product, or of an athlete whose degree of fault is light, or even of a cheater on a single occasion, but of an athlete, who put in place a careful scheme to avoid detection of the prohibited substances or methods he was using, but still gain the advantage of his unlawful practice¹⁷. At the same time, the gravity of the Athlete's anti-doping rule violation is accentuated by the fact that this is the second infringement for which the Athlete is found responsible;
- ii. as to the effects of the infringements on the results at stake, the Panel is convinced by the

¹⁵ The Panel remarks indeed the experience and expertise of the Appellants' experts, and, as the most important element, the weight of published literature which supported their opinions.

¹⁶ The Panel in that regard understands, in fact, that (as explained by the experts heard at the hearing and underlined also in the case CAS 2010/A/2235, para 100) blood withdrawal produces lower than normal hemoglobin (HGB, measured by its weight in a given quantity of blood) and higher than normal percentage of reticulocytes in blood (RET%), since the bone marrow responds to blood loss by releasing a higher number of "young" blood cells. The reverse happens post EPO-stimulation, which produces an heritropoyetic suppression, *i.e.* an inhibition in the physiological process which produces red blood cells.

¹⁷ Note that in CAS 2013/A/3274, to which the Second Respondent refers, a negative test and the light degree of fault were decisive elements for the Sole Arbitrator not to disqualify the results: para. 89 of the award of 31 January 2014.

Appellant's submissions, based on the expert reports, that blood doping, in the way it was conducted by the Athlete, was intended to have, and actually had, long-lasting effects, as *inter alia* it improved the Athlete's capacity to train, for, otherwise, the Athlete's use of a prohibited method or of a prohibited substance chiefly in pre-competition periods would be substantially devoid of purpose. Therefore, the raising of doubts by the Respondents as to the abnormality of the analytical results of some of the samples in the Athlete's ABP does not mean that at the time those samples were collected the Athlete was not "benefiting" from the effects of blood doping evidenced by abnormal samples. It cannot therefore be maintained that some of the competitions in the period following (or comprised within) the various cycles of blood manipulation were not affected by the Athlete's doping practices;

- iii. as to the principle applied in the case CAS 2010/A/2235, the Panel remarks that the CAS Panel in that case, unlike the Anti-Doping Committee, disqualified all results in the period between the first and the last abnormal sample and considered, in applying the fairness exception, that it was unlikely that the results outside this period had been affected by the athlete's anti-doping violation. In the Athlete's case, the Panel considers that the Athlete's repeated violations of the anti-doping regulations over a long period of time make it impossible to exclude, in "fairness", some results, and chiefly the result obtained at the 2011 European Race Walking Cup, at the 2012 Russian Winter Indoor Meeting, at the 2012 World Race Walking Cup and at the 2012 Olympic Games from disqualification;
- iv. as to the length of time between the anti-doping rule violation, the result to be disqualified and the starting date of the ineligibility period, the Panel underlines that such factor does not justify application of the "fairness exception". Indeed, the most recent "doping cycle" evidenced by the ABP took place in 2012, at the Olympic Games, only a few months before the day on which the Athlete's provisional suspension commenced;
- v. as to the absence of positive tests and the method applied to evaluate the samples provided by the Athlete to find an anti-doping rule violation, the Panel notes that the ABP profile has been validated in a long line of CAS cases (see *inter alia*: CAS 2010/A/2174; TAS 2010/A/2178; CAS 2010/A/2308 & 2335; CAS 2012/A/2773; as well as CAS 2010/A/2235) as a reliable means to detect blood doping, even in the absence of positive tests, through the identification of abnormal values calling for an explanation by the athlete in question. Even the Vorobiov Opinion, confirmed at the hearing by Professor Vorobiov himself, supports this conclusion. In addition, the Decision, unchallenged on this point, found the commission of repeated anti-doping rule violations based on the ABP evidence and the Athlete's failure to provide explanations regarding the abnormal values. In any case, the Panel is not persuaded by the literature invoked by the Second Respondent to cast doubts on the reliability of the ABP program. The Panel remarks that such literature dates back from some years ago and deals more with legal than scientific issues, and is therefore more than comfortably satisfied that the finding of an anti-doping rule violation based on the review of the Athlete's ABP does not constitute a ground not to disqualify (for reasons of "fairness") the results he obtained following his anti-doping rule violation;
- vi. as to the principle of proportionality, the Panel finds that, contrary to the Respondents'

contention, it requires the retroactive disqualification of results, rather than the opposite. The principle of proportionality implies that there must be a reasonable balance between the kind of misconduct and the sanction, and in particular that (i) the measure taken by the governing body can achieve the envisaged goal, (ii) the measure taken by the governing body is necessary to reach the envisaged goal, and (iii) the constraints on the affected person resulting from the measure are justified by the overall interest of achieving the envisaged goal. In other words, to be proportionate, a measure must not exceed what is reasonably required in the search for a legitimate objective (CAS 2005/C/976 & 986, §§ 139-140, citing CAS precedents, legal doctrine and Swiss jurisprudence). In this respect, the Panel notes that:

- the purpose of disqualification in the Athlete's case is *inter alia* to prevent him from gaining the advantage sought by his intentional, continued and severe doping violations over other competitors, who competed without doping;
- the measure of disqualification is certainly capable of achieving the envisaged goal, since it implies the cancellation of the results obtained;
- the measure of disqualification is necessary to reach the envisaged goal, because the Athlete, who cheated in the preparation of a given competition, would otherwise keep the benefits of the results achieved to the detriment of clean competitors, and
- the constraints on the Athlete are justified by the overall interest of achieving the envisaged goal.

122. In light of the foregoing and of an overall evaluation of all relevant elements, the Panel concludes that all competitive results obtained by the Athlete from the date of first commission of the anti-doping rule violation (25 February 2011) through to the commencement of his provisional suspension (17 December 2012) must be disqualified, with all resulting consequences in accordance with Article 40.9 of the 2009 IAAF Rules. No reasons of fairness can be found not to disqualify them.

3.7 Conclusion

123. In light of the foregoing, the Panel unanimously holds that the appeal brought by IAAF is to be allowed. Pursuant to the parties' agreement, the period of ineligibility to be applied to the Athlete is reduced to 8 years, starting from the date of the Athlete's provisional suspension (17 December 2012). All competitive results obtained by the Athlete from 25 February 2011 to 17 December 2012 are disqualified, with all resulting consequences in accordance with Article 40.9 of the 2009 IAAF Rules. Points 2 and 3 of the Decision are modified accordingly.

ON THESE GROUNDS

The Court of Arbitration for Sport rules that:

1. The appeal filed on 25 March 2015 by the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) against the decision issued on 20 January 2015 by the Disciplinary Anti-Doping Committee of the Russian Anti-Doping Agency is granted.
2. Points 2 and 3 of the decision issued on 20 January 2015 by the Disciplinary Anti-Doping Committee of the Russian Anti-Doping Agency are partially modified.
3. Mr Vladimir Kanaikin is declared ineligible for a period of 8 (eight) years starting on 17 December 2012. All competitive results obtained by Mr Vladimir Kanaikin from 25 February 2011 to 17 December 2012 are disqualified, with all resulting consequences in accordance with Article 40.9 of the IAAF Anti-Doping Rules.

(...)

7. All other motions or prayers for relief are dismissed.